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INTRODUCTION
Views on nuclear power are quite polarized and 
often there is more emotion than thought involved in the 
various opinions. I have also found in the course of my 
research that, in the last few years, some possible long 
term deficiencies in the economics of nuclear power may 
have surfaced. Every effort has been made to present all 
sides of each issue.
In the wake of the Three Mile Island accident and 
the less than expected growth of demand for nuclear power, 
the nuclear industry in the United States seems to be fal­
tering. The industry has already invested approximately 
$230 billion to construct, operate, and maintain commer­
cial nuclear generating stations and their supporting 
infrastructure. The federal government has funded an 
additional $40 billion —  used principally for R&D on 
light water reactor technology. This United States light 
water reactor technology has formed the basis for all of 
the successful light water nuclear programs in the world.
The Japanese, the Germans and the French are all 
using the contemporary U.S. light water reactor technology 
as the foundation for their nuclear programs.^
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The Industry
The nuclear power industry is made up of 24 giant
multinational corporations and may constitute the single
largest and most powerful business enterprise in history.
In 1981, they sold $400 billion worth of products. All but
five of these behemoths rank among the one hundred fifty
biggest companies in America. The enormous influence that
they have in the United States is amplified by their close
association with eight of the nine largest banks, the
seven largest insurance companies and many top investment
and law firms, not to mention the strong support of the
government. These factors combine to assure access to
2large pools of capital.
The day when nuclear power will be the world's 
leading electricity source now seems to have been postponed 
indefinitely. Nuclear power is plagued by many serious 
issues that remain unresolved, including safety, waste 
disposal, and nuclear weapons proliferation. Something 
much simpler, however, is giving the industry most of its 
current problems. In most countries, nuclear power is no 
longer economically attractive. Years of cost overruns 
have destroyed the economic underpinnings of many programs, 
and much slower growth in electricity use has called into 
question the need for many nuclear plants now being built. 
All indications are that nuclear power's economic com­
petitiveness continues to deteriorate and could lead to
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further cutbacks. Indeed, the development of nuclear 
power may come to a complete standstill by the late 
eighties.^
In Chapter One, I will explore the questions of 
Why Nuclear Power? and Row Much Nuclear Power is required? 
We will examine what the international market looks like.
I will list and explain in layman's terms the types of 
technology used and the safety precautions and concerns 
in each of the countries that presently use nuclear 
energy.
Chapter Two will explain why Third World countries 
want nuclear technology and why the major suppliers of 
nuclear technology envision these Third World countries as 
being important customers.
Chapter Three will examine the Nuclear Prolifera­
tion issue (To export or not to export?). Some of the 
dangers of nuclear proliferation will be examined from the 
standpoint of the nation states and terrorists. We will 
show some of the reasons why nation states want to acquire 
nuclear weaponry. Additionally, this chapter will give 
some insight into where the world is in regard to nuclear 
proliferation. We will look at the proliferation problem 
from the point of view of; The U.S. government's position, 
the U.S. nuclear industry's position, the position of the 
U.S. allies and the Third World position.
Chapter Four will evaluate nuclear power from the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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sociotechnical standpoint. We will get a perspective of 
public attitude and what the total social cost of nuclear 
power is. The externalities of nuclear power will be 
examined and what those would mean to the countries 
receiving the exported technology. A comparison will be 
made of "normal emissions" of radioactive gasses versus 
background radiation, in terms of dosage and danger. We 
will take an in-depth look at what the "Worst Case Nuclear 
Accident" in a light water reactor would be like; how that 
differs from what the public perception is and why. Other 
public perceptions of nuclear externalities will be ex­
amined and analyzed. A comparison will be made of the 
hazards associated with working in the nuclear industry 
versus working in other vocations. The discussion will 
include what nuclear waste is made of; how this waste has 
become an issue and how that issue has progressed. We will 
explore what methods are the most promising for waste dis­
posal and how those methods relate to the reality of Third 
World capabilities or the lack thereof. Some alternative 
disposal methods will be examined along with environmental 
and institutional considerations.
In Chapter Five, the economic costs of nuclear, 
coal-fired and solar energy will be contrasted. Then, some 
of the environmental impacts of the alternative technolo­
gies will be enumerated. We will examine some of the more 
salient aspects of conservâtionism and how they apply to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Third World nations.
Chapter Six will contain my conclusions and recom­
mendations as to the exportation of Nuclear Power.
The Appendix will contain a brief history of 
Nuclear Power for those who have an interest in such mat­
ters. Of course, it is always a good idea to know where 
we have been, as we consider where we are going.
Preview
A recent article in the Wall Street Journal indi­
cates a grim assessment of the nuclear industry's condi­
tion. "Nuclear power cannot at this time be considered a 
viable option on which to base new electric generating 
capacity in the U.S.," said the 31 member panel headed by 
Robert Smith, retired chairman of Public Service Electric 
& Gas Co., Newark, N.J. The panel said:
"Until there is more certainty and stability in 
the licensing and regulation of nuclear power 
and construction lead times have been reduced, 
and until there is a greater public concensus 
in favor of nuclear power, the private sector 
cannot take on the open-ended financial risks 
that now attend the nuclear power option."
It is interesting to note that this report was commissioned
by the Atomic Industrial Forum, the nuclear industry's own
promotional arm! The panel was made up of top utility,
industry and financial figures.^
Today, contraction has replaced expansion as the 
rate of investment in nuclear power has slumped around
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the world. What could be termed a "deep recession" in 
nuclear power, has had some advantages to the world as a 
whole. It has dealt a severe, if not mortal blow to the 
fast breeder reactor and thus to the surplus of fizzle 
(nuclear material that has been enriched with excess neu­
trons to the point that it is capable —  under the right 
circumstances —  of sustaining an uncontrolled chain reac­
tion - Weapons grade) material. This in turn, has slowed 
down the spread of nuclear technologies and materials to 
countries that may wish to develop nuclear weapons. The 
recession also brings with it problems. The suppliers are 
threatened with the possibility of losing their productive 
and technological capabilities.^
Unless quite dramatic changes occur in the outlook 
for nuclear power in the United States, its decline as a 
leading producer and developer of nuclear power plants 
would appear irreversible. By the 1990s, other nations —  
most likely West Germany and Japan —  may have replaced it 
at the hub of the industrial system. During the 1990s, the 
combination of economic revival, rising energy prices and 
the need to replace aging power plants of all types may 
bring some recovery to the nuclear industry. The possi­
bility of revival, however remote, is one of the primary 
reasons that the manufacturers are going to such lengths 
to stay in the business. It is also why governments are, 
for the most part, subsidizing their efforts.®
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The five leading producers, the U.S., Canada, 
France, West Germany, and Japan have differing prospects. 
Regarding domestic demand, the U.S. vendor’s position 
seems least favorable. After over a decade of losing 
money, the utilities will take a lot of convincing before 
they invest in nuclear power again. On the good side, it 
seems that the political and regulatory climates may be 
changing.
General Electric and Babcock & Wilcox have effec­
tively withdrawn from making offers for nuclear orders 
for the time being. Combustion Engineering may have to 
follow suit if foreign orders cannot be secured soon, most 
notably in Taiwan; and even Westinghouse is showing signs
7of strain.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Nuclear Power; Why and How Much?
Discussion
The central issues of this chapter:
1) Why there is a need for nuclear power.
2) How much nuclear power is needed?
3) The international market for nuclear power.
4) An insight into present nuclear technology.
5) Safety precautions and concerns regarding nuclear 
power.
Why Nuclear Power?
Internationally, the market for nuclear power 
plants is growing due to several factors. Some nations 
do not have the diversified energy resources that are 
available to the United States and the Soviet Union. They 
lack domestic supplies of coal, oil or natural gas, and 
many do not have hydroelectric options. These nations have 
had to import large supplies of fossil fuels to meet their 
energy needs in the past, or alternatively, they have not 
been able to take advantage of their growth potential.
Many industrialized countries have found that it is highly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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undesirable to be dependent upon fuel from outside sources, 
and this has made the nuclear option quite appealing. The 
Third World countries find that nuclear power may be the 
best route into the modern era. In any case, the question 
of justifying nuclear power introduction or expansion is 
unique to each country.^ Statistically, nuclear power 
worldwide is a fastgrowing industry (See Figure 1-1 to 
1-6). Figure 1-1 shows the percentage of nuclear elec­
trical generation by the Third World countries.
Figure 1-2 gives a comparison of nuclear genera­
tion by Third World countries and the rest of the non­
communist world minus the U.S. Note that, in this compari­
son, the Third World volume of generation is generally not 
significant.
Figure 1-3 compares U.S. nuclear generation with 
that of other non-communist countries. Note that growth 
for the other countries has been nearly linear to slightly 
exponential while that of the U.S. has basically stopped.
Figure 1-4 shows the third world, the non-communist 
industrialized nations and the U.S. nuclear growth within 
the context of total nuclear growth for the period. Note 
that all of the graphs show a distinct growth except that 
of the U.S.
Figure 1-5 shows an expanded view of what nuclear 
generation growth has been like for the Third World coun­
tries. Note that the growth shows an exponential tendency
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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but that this may be due to a number of nuclear generation 
plants coming on line at the same time (this does not 
necessarily indicate a growth in demand for the nuclear 
energy).
Figure 1-6 shows an expanded view of nuclear growth
for all of the non-communist countries; it appears quite
linear with a tendency to be exponential. This depicts
a healthy growth pattern for the industry for the period
21973 - 1983 in the non-communist world.
American suppliers, American constructors and 
American engineers are building American-designed nuclear 
power plants throughout the world. In many countries such 
as Japan, and soon China, these plants are built in just 
five or six years for a total cost of less than a billion 
dollars. It takes 12 years in the U.S., and as much as 
$4 billion to build the same kind of plant to the same 
safety requirements. Obviously, the question is, "Why?"
Philip Bray, of General Electric, states:
"We did a study of a typical nuclear power project 
and found that in countries such as Japan, France 
and Taiwan, the total cost of building a nuclear 
plant is less than $1 billion. In the U.S., we 
found that the original cost estimates grew by 
more than $3 billion - a billion for regulatory 
changes, a billion for the escalation of costs 
over the lengthy construction period and a billion 
for the interest on the bonds issued throughout the 
construction period."3
Given the growth in world population since mid­
century, the percentage rise in per capita oil consumption
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Between 1950 and 1979, the average individual's use of oil 
climbed from 1.56 barrels per year to 5.48 barrels, a gain 
of nearly fourfold. Since 1979, however, with world oil 
consumption declining while the number of people continued 
to increase, the per capita decline has been precipitous. 
Falling nearly 20 percent in four years, it has affected 
every facet of human existence from diets to transporta­
tion. The substantial adjustments of the last few years 
will continue for decades to come. "In retrospect, the 
world may be heavily indebted to OPEC for having raised 
the price of oil.
Demand for all forms of energy has not been in­
creasing, as was previously forecasted. Could this indi­
cate a new worldwide energy awareness that could change 
the energy marketplace in the long term?
Some would argue that, even if nuclear power is 
expensive, it is still essential as a replacement for im­
ported oil. Although it is true that nuclear power has
helped lower oil imports in some nations —  particularly
France and Japan —  in most countries its contribution has
been negligible, dwarfed by increased use of coal and by
energy efficiency. In the United States, oil imports have 
fallen 50 percent since 1973. Today, a small and shrinking 
fraction of the world's oil is used to generate electri-
5city, and the oil versus nuclear equation is largely moot.
Economically, nuclear power is often hard to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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justify. In many countries, an efficient size nuclear 
power plant would overtax the power grids of the country. 
Therefore, the power grids often have to be rebuilt; this 
sometimes drives the costs of nuclear power above those of 
fossil fuels. The economies of nuclear power are unique 
to each country.
Probably the major reason for using nuclear power 
is to free petroleum for other purposes; transportation is 
the most notable of these. The view also exists that burn­
ing oil for electricity is too wasteful since only about 
one-third of its energy content is captured in conventional 
power plants.
Spurred by the oil price hikes of the 1970s, France 
and Japan are using nuclear power to make rapid strides 
toward energy self-sufficiency. France obtains the highest 
proportion of its electricity from nuclear generation in 
the world. It is estimated that France will generate 75% 
of her needs through nuclear power by 1990. Japan re­
ceived 21% of its electricity from nuclear plants in 1983. 
Determined to reduce its dependence on foreign oil, Japan 
has committed to building 27 new nuclear plants over the 
next ten years. This will more than double the amount of 
electricity generated by nuclear plants in Japan. Their 
long-term commitment to nuclear energy includes plans for 
a new $4 billion facility for uranium enrighment, fuel re­
processing and permanent waste disposal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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National security is a goal that most nations feel 
they must attain. Energy self-sufficiency, elusive by any 
standard, is an important part of that security and is 
best approached by some countries through nuclear power by 
using their own supplies of uranium. Japan has no deposits 
of uranium and still opts for nuclear power as one of its 
chief sources of energy. Even the United States has pur­
sued other forms of energy since the 1973 oil embargo 
(albeit not to the degree necessary to achieve true energy 
independence).
Prestige enters into the question of, "Why?" in 
that many countries seemingly have decided to pursue 
nuclear power chiefly as a symbol of entry into twentieth 
century technology. Table 1-1 gives a breakdown of the 
nuclear commitment by each of the major nuclear generat­
ing countries.
Finally, a significant motive for acquiring nuclear 
power is the enhancement of the country's scientific com­
munity's expertise in the field of nuclear technology. A 
country may not have plans to build nuclear weapons, yet 
might want to have the technology available should the 
need for the weapons arises. Indeed, there are definitely 
some countries that want the weapons. This aspect will be 
discussed at length in Chapter Three.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 1-1
WORLD HIDE NUCLEAR POWER COMMITMENT, by END OF 1983*
Country Plants
Operating
Plants Ordered 
and Under
Construction
Total
Ccfnitnent
Number Megawatts Number Megawatts Number Megawatts
United States 77 60,026 64 70,376 141 130,402
France 31 21,778 31 34,520 62 56,298
West Germany 12 9,8006 17 19,516 29 29,322
Japan 25 16,552 15 12,649 40 29,301
Soviet Union 34 18,915 11 9,880 45 28,795
Canada
United
12 6,622 12 8,710 24 15,322
Kingdom 34 9,273 8 5,115 42 14,388
Spain 6 3,820 7 6,801 13 10,621
Sweden 10 7,300 2 2,110 12 9,410
South Korea 1 556 8 6,710 9 7,266
Belgium 5 3,450 2 2,000 7 5,450
Switzerland 4 1,940 3 3,007 7 4,947
Taiwan 4 3,110 2 1,814 6 4,924
Czechoslovakia 2 880 8 3,520 10 4,400
Italy 3 1,285 3 2,004 6 3,289
Brazil - - 3 3,116 3 3,116
East Germany 5 1,830 2 880 7 2,710
India 4 804 6 1,320 10 2,124
Argentina 
The Rest
1 335 2 1,292 3 1,627
of the World 12 5,205 21 14,044 33 19,249
World Total 282 173,587 227 289,384 509 382,971
(7) *Preliiinary estimate.
Source; 'The World List of Nuclear Power Plants, • Nuclear News, August 1983; 
Atomic Industrial Forum, “Historical Profile of U.S. Nuclear Power Development,' 
Washington, D.C., March 1383.
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How Much Nuclear Power?
A study of worldwide investment in nuclear power 
indicates that, between now and the year 2010, investment 
in nuclear power could amount to about one trillion 
dollars.^
The World Energy Conference suggests a program for 
the installation of nuclear capacity, worldwide, by the 
year 2020 of between 3,200,000 Mw. and 5,500,000 Mw.^
Demand for energy is increasing worldwide, and with
that increase, there is a corresponding demand for nuclear
capacity. In the European community, demand for energy
by the year 2000 will have increased between 1.5 and 2
times. The anticipated growth is similar in Japan, and in
the remaining parts of the world, it may well increase by
three times by the start of the next c e n t u r y . C o n t r a s t
this to Douglas Cogan's (an energy analyst with Investor
Responsibility Research Center) assessment in the November
8, 1984, issue of the Wall Street Journal in which he said,
”A survey by us indicates that conservation and 
load management programs being developed by 
utilities could cut future power needs in the U.S. 
by the equivalent of 30 new nuclear plants. If 
utilities really 'put their money where their 
mouths are,' energy-conserving programs could 
stave off the need for virtually any new plant 
construction this century —  and cost less than 
half as much as new construction. " H
What we have here is an indication that not only is the
nuclear power industry in trouble in the United States from
the standpoint of public opinion, but also its capabilities
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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may not be needed in the U.S. when viewed in the light of 
conservâtionism. This leads one to believe that there is 
an imperative for the nuclear industry to use every means 
at its disposal to find projects for its technical per­
sonnel in other countries in order to keep them on staff 
and to remain viable for the long haul.
It is not just in the United States that nuclear 
power faces a less secure future than was expected just 
five years ago. Although most governments with major 
nuclear programs —  including France, Japan, and the 
Soviet Union —  remain strongly committed to nuclear power, 
there is a growing gap between rhetorical and monetary 
support and the actual achievements of the nuclear pro­
grams. Behind the lagging pace lie diminished growth in
electricity demand and a long list of technical, economic
12and political problems.
National Experience
Canada
Canadians tend to be more trusting of their utili­
ties and more confident about nuclear power than their U.S. 
counterparts. Indeed, the Canadian nuclear industry has 
not been plagued with the problems that have dogged the 
U.S. industry. Five of the world's most efficient reactors 
are in Canada; no planned reactors have been cancelled 
there, and they take half as long to build there as they
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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do here. In fact, Canada is even exporting nuclear power 
to the United States. The Canadian nuclear industry has 
a major advantage over the nuclear industry in the U.S. in 
that Canada's 13 completed reactors and the nine under 
construction follow the same design. This makes techni­
cal problems easier to solve and licensing merely a matter 
of inspection and power-up monitoring. Although the 
Canadian industry has had its minor problems of small cost 
overruns, its nuclear program has been successful mainly 
because the nation took one product, the Candu -- for 
Canadian deuterium uranium (it uses both deuterium and 
uranium to create nuclear fission), and they perfected it. 
In the U.S., on the other hand, every one of the sixty odd 
utilities want a custom plant, and so the learning curve 
that is so important to an industry never has a chance to 
run. The U.S. and most other nations use light water 
reactors, which rely on the heat of uranium fission to boil 
water. The steam produced turns a turbine to generate 
electricity. Canadian technology was controlled from the 
very start by two levels of government that approved de­
signs and plans. These were then handed to the nuclear 
power industry which relegated the industry in Canada to 
that of a manufacturer. When a problem surfaced, govern­
ment and industry got together to solve it. The Candu uses 
hundreds of small pressure tubes rather than a large core 
contained in one large pressure vessel, as with the light
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water reactors. Thus, if one of the small tubes should 
rupture, there is little likelihood of serious contamina­
tion. In August of this year, there was a rupture of a 
pressure tube that did cause a minor loss of coolant acci­
dent. Upon investigation, it was found to be due to an 
alloy that is no longer used in newer reactors.
Canadians learned early on to regard training and safety
. , 13 as crucial.
Ten years ago, someone suggested that the U. S. 
finance a line of Candus along the border and pump the 
energy south much like milking a giant power cow. This is 
not likely; however. New England states already import 
about one-third of the output of New Brunswick's reactor, 
and the Canadians would like to see that increase so they 
can build another reactor in the province. What is in­
volved with Canada is the antithesis of this paper, in 
that we are in this case importing —  not exporting -- 
nuclear power.
France
France has made the most notable shift to nuclear
power; they set a goal of 36,200 Mw. of added nuclear
capacity to be installed between 1970 and 1985. Earlier
delays are being overcome, and by 1985, they anticipate
that electricity from nuclear power will provide fifty-
15six percent of their total requirements.
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The scarcity of coal, oil and natural gas has made 
it necessary for France to rely on nuclear energy and to 
develop an ambitious program that encompasses nearly all 
types of nuclear installations from uranium mines to waste 
repositories, including uranium-enrichment facilities, 
irradiated fuel reprocessing plants and various types of 
reactors. With the first oil crisis in 1973, the French 
government decided to launch a massive construction pro­
gram of pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) of which twenty- 
six 900 Mw. units are presently in operation and twenty- 
five more (900-1300 Mw.) are under construction. There 
are two important characteristics of French nuclear power. 
They are : standardization of technology and the fact that 
France has only one utility. Electricité' de France (EDF), 
which also acts as its own architect-engineer for nuclear 
power plants. There is but one contractor for their 
nuclear plants, FRAMETOME (Société' Fronco-Amricaine de 
Constructions Atomiques, Puteaux, France), which is a 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation licensee. This limited 
number of partners in the French regulatory procedure 
should be kept in mind when considering the economies of 
nuclear power in this country.
When France embarked on a PWR program, the authori­
ties decided in the beginning that U.S. experience should 
be used to minimize costs and delays and also to allow 
competent teams to be progressively formed. Each of the
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three partners used U.S. experience.
Gradually, a French safety philosophy took shape, 
but it should be kept in mind that the French philosophy 
started with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
regulations, which were always used for reference.
Economic realities have proved much more hazardous 
to the French nuclear program than political opposition. 
Growth of electricity demand has been gradually showing 
since the late seventies, and in 1982, the government 
reduced its forecast of growth in the eighties by 50 per­
cent. This means that France would have at least 13 per­
cent too much generating capacity in 1990. Even many of 
the strongest supporters of nuclear power in France now 
admit that, from an electrical demand standpoint, no
additional plant orders are needed for at least several 
17years.
Germany
In contrast to the governmental nuclear energy pro­
grams in Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the 
U.S.S.R., the introduction of nuclear power plants in the 
Federal Republic of Germany was left to the existing public 
utilities. The first few nuclear power plants were con­
structed under licenses of U.S. vendors. The role of
government was restricted to that of promoter of research
18and development.
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At first, two large German electrical corporations 
developed and constructed two separate and independent 
lines of nuclear power plants. The Boiling Water Reactor 
(BWR) was built in cooperation with General Electric 
Company. The Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) was built in 
cooperation with Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Later, 
another PWR was introduced in cooperation with the U.S. 
firm, Babcock & Wilcox Company.
In addition, the government sponsored the develop­
ment and construction of other reactor types —  heavy water 
reactor, pressure tube reactor, sodium cooled reactor, fast 
sodium-cooled reactor, gas cooled high temperature reactor, 
nuclear steam superheater, and a ship reactor. Some of 
these were through independent development and some due to 
close international cooperation. Presently, there are five 
BWR units operating in the Federal Republic of Germany with 
a total of 3299 Mw. and three units with 3936 Mw. under 
construction. Of the PWR type, there are seven units with
a total of 6965 Mw. in operation and seven more with a
20total of 9363 Mw. under construction.
Opponents of the German nuclear power program have 
been successful in raising issues of safety, environmental 
damage, and cost effectiveness in licensing hearings and in 
the courts. Project delays and cost overruns have been 
common. Meanwhile, electricity demand growth rates have 
dropped substantially, and the country has been under
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increasing economic pressure, which makes investment in
21capital intensive projects much less attractive.
Sweden
Sweden faces the situation of depending heavily on
nuclear power in the near term, while having decided to
abandon the nuclear option in the long term. This is as
a result of an early commitment to a substantial nuclear
program and an intensive political debate during the late
1970s, which ended in a referendum on the nuclear power
issue. Concerns about reactor safety, waste management,
and proliferation risks played an important role in the
debate and the decision by the Parliament in 1980 after
22the referendum.
The nuclear power program in Sweden is based on 
the use of 12 light water reactors (LWRs), 9 of which are 
BWRs of Swedish design. When the last two units are com­
missioned in 1985-1986, nuclear power will supply 50% of
23the nation's electricity needs.
Britain
The government is in the midst of a major decision 
on the future of its nuclear program. The nationwide 
government-owned utility has proposed that the country 
begin building a new generation of light water nuclear 
plants based on the American Westinghouse design. Consider­
able controversy surrounds the economic soundness of the
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proposal. The utility now admits that the country's most
recent gas-cooled nuclear plants cost twice as much to
build as coal-fired plants, but it still argues that light
24water plants can be produced at an attractive price.
Beyond the 8,500 Mw, of nuclear capacity that now 
supply 13 percent of the country's electricity, only 
another 5,500 Mw. worth are under construction, much of 
which is near completion. The high cost of the plants 
built so far and the forecasts that electricity demand 
will grow little, if at all, in the next decade provide 
ample economic hurdles to a revitalized nuclear construc­
tion program. Without the proposed new LWR program, the
25nuclear industry in Britain would soon wither.
Europe Overall
The total commitment to nuclear power in Europe 
has risen only 10 percent since 1978, and almost all the 
gain comes from France. The number of British and West 
German projects has risen slightly, while the numbers in 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Italy have fallen. Nuclear 
capacity projections have been lowered by nearly two-thirds 
since 1970.^®
Japan
Japan's experience with nuclear energy began with 
technology from the United Kingdom. The Japanese had to 
modify the U.K. reactors to take into account the
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possibility of earthquake that was not considered by the
British. The next generation of nuclear technology came
from the U.S. and, in particular, from Westinghouse in
the form of a PWR and from General Electric as a BWR. The
commitments by these two companies influenced the electric
27utilities and introduced the era of the LWR in Japan,
Public concern for nuclear safety grew and re­
sulted in a policy decision to address problems immediately, 
no matter how insignificant they might appear to be, so 
that those problems would not lead to serious accidents,
and then to incorporate the solutions into actual reactor 
28operations.
To date, Japanese LWR technology, which is based 
on American technology with input from Japanese experience, 
has been aimed at continually improved reliability and 
safety to establish the "Japanese type" LWR. The capital 
cost of nuclear power is 60% of the total energy costs and 
basically represents construction costs. The increase in 
nuclear power plant construction costs in Japan exceeds 
that of the general wage scale and the price index because 
of increased costs for safety and reliability measures as 
well as inflation during long construction periods.
Conclusions to be drawn from Chapter One:
1) Many countries do not have the options of alternative 
resources such as coal, nor do they have topography that
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will allow hydroelectric power development. The only way 
for many of them to enter the realm of modern civilization 
is through nuclear power. Nuclear energy frees many coun­
tries from the dependence on oil imports and bolsters their 
national security accordingly. Finally, another reason for 
pursuing the nuclear option is gathering the wherewithal 
to have a nuclear weapons capability.
2) Conservation has slowed the growth in demand for nu­
clear energy significantly; however, the population con­
tinues to increase. With that increase eventually will 
come a time when rising expectations will demand more elec­
trical power. The question o f ,"how much nuclear energy?" 
remains clouded since there are many unresolved technical, 
economic and political problems.
3) Many countries have embraced nuclear technology and 
have developed or are developing the capability to gener­
ate their energy with it. Most of the world's technology 
is based on the United States Light Water Reactor. In most 
cases, the countries become generally self-sufficient re­
garding the technology required to operate their plants 
rather quickly but remain dependent on the suppliers for 
fuel reprocessing and enriched uranium, or for expansion
of their nuclear facilities. The more advanced countries 
have themselves become exporters of nuclear technology.
4) The trend in nuclear safety is toward a walk-away 
reactor. The concept is that, when a condition occurs
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that threatens the reactor's operation, the reactor has 
safety features that rely on the laws of physics rather 
than on man-made devices. This eliminates the need for 
decisions made under stress to right the situation and 
allows the operator the opportunity to research the problem 
properly before taking corrective action.
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CHAPTER TWO 
Nuclear Power and the Third World 
Discussion 
The central issues of this chapter;
1) Why the Third World nations want nuclear technology.
2) Why the suppliers of nuclear technology see the Third 
World as an important customer.
The forces behind the energy situation that con­
front the Third World countries are: the exploitation of
the world's low cost fossil energy resources ; development 
of nuclear power; growth of energy interdependence on a 
global scale; and emergence of environmental constraints 
on energy resource development and u s e .^
Developing countries have quite different growth 
patterns than industrialized nations. This growth is 
characterized as exponential and stems from the fact that, 
when you have very little, as growth occurs the rising 
expectations of the populace require even more growth.
Once a country becomes industrialized, the growth becomes 
generally more linear. Countries that are developing have 
a psychology of acceptance with regard to nuclear power
that is based somewhat on a desire to enter the world of
36
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twentieth-century technology with all of its perceived
advantages of a higher standard of living. Latin America
is a good case in point. Brazil has extensive nuclear
power growth plans because their increased requirement of
electricity cannot be solved by coal or hydroelectric
power alone. The projected growth of nuclear power in
Brazil is not unique; Latin America appears to offer the
greatest external market for exporters of nuclear reactors,
2technology and services for the next ten years.
In addition to accelerating expectations, the popu­
lation of Latin America is growing at a rate that should 
see it nearly double by the year 2000 (See Table 2-1).
There is no question that vast quantities of energy 
would be required to bring the developing countries from 
their low standards of living to the standards of much of 
Europe, let alone the standards of the United States.
These developing nations are looking for the industrialized 
nations to provide them with ways of producing more energy. 
As they develop, and as personal income increases, the
3people will want more lighting and appliances.
Prestige, a consuming interest for any politician, 
is normally defined in terms of an accepted theory for 
national welfare. Reality has debunked the fantasy that 
nuclear power would make deserts bloom and villages prosper. 
The estimated cost of a $3,500 - per kilowatt for Brazil's 
Angra II reactor, which is at least four times the cost of
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Table 2-1
PREDICTED GHOMH IN REACTORS AND POPULATION IN LATIN AFRICA
Country Numbn* of Reactors 
Planned or Announced
Possible 
Additions 
By Yr. 2000
1979
Population
(Millions)
Est. 2080
Population
(Millions)
Brazil 9 10-30 110 225
Argentina 4 2-4 25 35
Chile 1 1-2 11 17
Peru 0 1-2 15 35
Columbia 0 1-2 29 48
Venezuela 1 1-3 16 35
Mexico 2 2-10 62 130
Others 0 0-4 71 75
Totals 17 10-57 340 600
(5) Source: Temple, Octave Du, and Hemelly, Edward, "Latin America: Emerging Nuclear Market", 
Nuclear News, September 1979, pp. 39.
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local central station power alternative, must now strike
4Brazilian national planners as less than seductive.
The predicted growth in nuclear reactors, as shown 
in Table 2-1 does not appear to be forthcoming due to 
economic factors that will be discussed later. Notice 
the date of the source.
Internationally, less than ten percent of energy 
consumption is by the Third World countries; however, as 
mentioned above, their growth of consumption will be far 
greater than the industrialized nations, and it is postu­
lated that consumption may reach as much as twenty percent 
of the world total by the year 2000.®
Contrast this to what a State of the World article 
says in 1984. During the sixties and seventies, develop­
ing countries had some of the brightest hopes for nuclear 
power, which Third World leaders viewed as a way to boost 
national prestige and reduce crippling oil import bills. 
Industrialized countries dispatched experts to promote the 
economic merits of nuclear power.
A deteriorating world economy since 1980 has led 
to a significant trimming of the Third World's 
most active nuclear programs. The capital in­
tensity of nuclear power plants makes them a 
burden to debt-strapped developing countries, 
particularly since much of the money must be 
spent abroad, draining scarce foreign exchange. 
Substituting nuclear import bills for oil im­
port charges is not seen by most Third World 
leaders as much of a gain.'
Latin America was a booming market for nuclear
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power in the seventies, but it, too, has fallen on hard 
times. Argentina has had a small plant operating since 
the early seventies and two more are being built. Wrapped 
in the cloak of nationalism, Argentina's nuclear program 
has enjoyed strong government support, and the country 
hopes to have six operating plants by the end of the 
century. Crippling debt problems, however, have cast doubt 
on these goals and anything beyond the two now being built 
is unlikely.®
Brazil, the world's sixth most populous country, 
has one plant complete and two under construction. The 
country planned to have eight plants operating by the early 
nineties, largely relying on West German technology, but 
major technical problems and a lack of capital have ren­
dered these goals meaningless. Brazil will be lucky to 
complete the two now being worked o n .^
Current plans indicate that developing countries 
will have at most 20,000 Mw. of nuclear capacity by 1990, 
which is only one-seventh as much as the International 
Atomic Energy Agency had projected in the early seventies. 
Yet, even these numbers overrate the economic viability of 
nuclear power in developing countries. All the nuclear 
sales in the Third World so far were subsidized by indus­
trial country governments or manufacturers. The day when 
nuclear plants are sufficiently cost-effective that 
developing countries will buy them at the full price is
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far off
Beyond these problems lies the more fundamental 
question of whether nuclear power is a wise use of scarce 
resources for a developing country. Nuclear power creates 
fewer jobs and requires more dependence on foreign com­
panies and governments than does almost any other invest­
ment a Third World nation can make. Along with the eco­
nomic issue is the growing realization that nuclear power 
plants are inviting targets for military and terrorist 
attacks in politically unstable regions.
The nuclear industry is looking quite favorably at 
prospects outside of the United States. Bechtel Group, 
Inc. is trying to stay alive until the day comes when 
nuclear power comes into its own. They are constructing 
fossil fired plants and drumming up nuclear construction 
jobs outside of the U.S. through the use of "financial 
engineering" much like a car dealer who helps with the 
financing. Bechtel now searches the globe on a far larger 
scale for billions of dollars so that their cash strapped 
customers can build their projects. "It's almost typical 
now," says Alden Yates, Bechtel's President. "In much of 
the Third World, you can't get a job unless you bring the 
money." Another form of financial engineering Bechtel is 
exploring is barter. A spokesman of Bechtel said that the 
company has offered to swap nuclear power plant construc­
tion management services for unspecified Yugoslavian
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commodities, but no deal has been made yet. He acknowl­
edges that such a course suggests strains on the world 
finance system. Still, he is optimistic about the future.
"The world's population is growing and expectations are
12growing. Things are going to get built."
Importing of fuel seems to be the only answer for 
most of the Third World nations along with hydroelectric 
development when possible. Oil will, most likely, be used 
chiefly for transportation, leaving coal (the primary 
sources of which are the Ü. S. and Australia) as the fossil 
fuel alternative. Considering shipping costs and afore­
mentioned desire for self-reliance, nuclear and hydro­
electric power will be the technologies to receive most of
13these countries' investments. This means that enriched 
uranium will be increasing in importance as an import for 
these countries since the only way to circumvent its im­
porting would be to develop breeder reactors, which is con­
sidered a technology too high for developing nations to 
achieve or to maintain. An exception to this might be
India where, with the aid of France, they are constructing
14a 15 Mw. fast breeder reactor.
The National Academy of Sciences feels that nuclear 
power will play a significant role in developing nations. 
They state:
"As energy growth occurs in developing nations, 
electricity demand will probably grow more rapidly 
because electricity prices are less sensitive to
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fuel costs. If the market is the principal determi­
nant of relative demand, and if there are no non­
economic constraints on the rate at which nuclear 
capacity can be expanded, then two-thirds or more 
of electricity would probably be supplied by 
nuclear power, with coal a distant second, consumed 
mostly in the United States.
There can be little doubt that, for industrializa­
tion to occur at all, sizable energy resources must be 
available to a country. Many developing countries already 
face unfavorable and often potentially devastating balance 
of payments problems which could force them to adopt 
nuclear power at a rate that is not socially nor technolog­
ically sound.
There are other problems with nuclear power. One 
is the inability of power grids in many Third World coun­
tries to carry the output of a modern nuclear power plant. 
This problem increases the costs of adopting nuclear power 
since grids have to be updated. The significant economies 
of scale associated with the larger plants would be lost 
to many countries if they developed reactors that were of 
a size more aligned with their power requirements and grid 
constraints. Thus, there are tradeoffs, but most coun­
tries have opted for the larger plants in the past. A 
happy note is that there are several suppliers who are 
beginning to tailor their designs to the less capital and 
power intensive needs of developing nations. (See modular 
High Temperature Gas Reactors, Chapter Five.)
Another concern is that, since the technology of
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nuclear power is imported and these countries little under­
stand it nor do they have competent regulatory agencies to 
control it, the nuclear power plants may not be built nor 
operated in a safe and efficient manner. The mere use of 
electricity over other forms of energy (manpower, animals,
etc.) may well require a lengthy period of transition for
* . 16 many countries.
Conclusions to be drawn from Chapter Two:
1) Growth in demand for electrical energy is generally 
exponential in developing countries. Many of these coun­
tries do not have the alternative energy resources avail­
able to the industrialized nations. Politically there is 
much to be gained by being able to claim that the efforts 
of a particular administration is bringing a country into 
the twentieth century.
2) The suppliers see developing countries as potentially 
lucrative customers because these countries do not possess 
the expertise to build their own nuclear facilities. There 
are many problems to be overcome regarding the exportation 
of nuclear technology, but at least there is a potential 
market, whereas, in the United States and in many indus­
trialized countries, the market has withered. Being able 
to use their expertise elsewhere allows the suppliers to 
keep essential staff.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Nuclear Proliferation 
Discussion
The central issues of this chapter:
1) Whether of not to export nuclear technology.
2) Some of the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
3) Why some of the nation states would want nuclear 
weapons.
4) Where the world is in regards to nuclear proliferation
5) The nuclear proliferation issue from the industry's, 
the government's, the allies' of the Unites States 
and from the Third World's point of view.
In 1972, while in the Air Force, I flew with some 
Israeli pilots and, after becoming friends with one, he 
said, pointing to the nuclear weapons delivery panel in
the cockpit, "One day soon we shall have these in our air­
craft . "
A world in which many more countries acquire nuclear 
weapons could be a much less pleasant one. Wars 
that today kill thousands might instead kill millions;
wars that now are averted might instead be launched
simply because each side preemptively hastened to 
use its weapons, feeling that it dared not hesitate.^
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty demands that all
46
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but five of the nations of the world renounce nuclear wea­
pons; the authors of the treaty naturally are among the
2privileged five.
Nat ional
Nuclear Club
The nuclear "club" which evolved in the 1960s in­
cluded the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, France and 
China. India joined after shocking the world with its 1974 
"peaceful nuclear explosion." (At that time India said,
"We wanted to keep ourselves abreast of all aspects of the 
possibilities and benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions.") 
Most western analysts believe that Israel quietly acquired 
a nuclear arsenal in the late 1960s or early 1970s. Now, 
there is concern that a number of others may be nearing the 
threshold; among them Argentina, South Africa, Libya, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Iraq. These countries have developed the 
nuclear fuel reprocessing capability that can only be asso­
ciated with massive nuclear generation or an ongoing wea-
3pons program.
Argentina
One of the key policies of the current U. S. 
Administration is to ensure that Argentina does not con­
struct nuclear weapons. Last November, Admiral Carlos 
Castro Madero, the head of the Argentina National Atomic
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Energy Commission, announced that his country had succeeded 
in enriching the content in uranium of the isotope U-235 
to 20%. This is the enrichment level required for 
Argentina's reactors. Foreign experts note that bridging 
the gap between 20% enriched uranium and fizzle material 
(90% enriched) is relatively inexpensive and not problema­
tic technically. (Fizzle material is essentially weapons 
grade nuclear fuel, enriched with added neutrons and 
capable of —  under the right circumstances —  sustaining 
an uncontrolled chain reaction.) A concern that the U.S. 
has and one that cannot be entirely discounted is that, 
sometime in the future, the Argentines may be governed by 
lunatics who, in an effort to display their national patri-
4otic fervor, may build "the bomb".
Foreigners control the technology that has been 
introduced into Argentina, including the three nuclear 
power reactors now in operation. However, installations 
built in Argentina with Argentine technology are another 
concern.
During the late 1970s, the Canadians were nego­
tiating with Argentina to build a nuclear power plant. The 
Canadians were eager for the Argentines to accept full 
scope safeguards, since it was one of their reactors from 
which the Indians had diverted spent fuel for its "peace­
ful" explosion; however, when they required the Argentines 
to renounce the right to acquire a plutonium-reprocessing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
capability, the Argentines broke off negotiations. That
5did not keep the plant from getting built.
Time and time again, the Argentines have seen the 
principles underlying the non-proliferation policies of 
the industrialized nations crumble in the way of commer­
cial considerations. They say that they can import any­
thing they want by demonstrating that they have the 
capability to develop the technology themselves. Should 
that fail, they buy from someone else.
There is every indication that Argentina intends 
to join the ranks of purveyors of nuclear energy services 
and technology.^
Pakistan
Israeli analysts estimate that Pakistan may have 
an operational nuclear capability of 10 Hiroshima-sized 
bombs by 1986. U.S. and Indian estimates are more cautious, 
although they agree that Pakistan is close to becoming a 
nuclear weapons state. If Pakistan is close, can others 
be far behind?^
The specter of an armed confrontation between India 
and Pakistan looms since, if India believes that Pakistan 
indeed is approaching weapons capability, she may decide 
a preemptive strike is in order. Israel has much to be 
concerned about —  a "Moslem bomb" -- and they, too may 
decide to unleash a strike such as they did under similar
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gcircumstances against Iraq in 1981.
The weapons effort in Pakistan has been getting a 
lot of help from many sources. The Netherlands has fur­
nished high strength steel of the type used in nuclear cen­
trifuges. A West German company sold Pakistan a flourida- 
tion plant which is required to make uranium hexaflouride. 
Conversion into this gas is a necessary stage in the 
uranium enrichment process. A Swiss company supplied a 
special gas system that could pump the gas into and out of 
the centrifuge, and U. S. companies have sold radiation-
resistant thermometers and airconditioning equipment neces-
gsary to complete the process.
The Pakistanis claim that they are doing all of 
this to enhance their power production capabilities and 
that the enriched uranium is to fuel reactors for the gene­
ration of electricity. Western experts are more than skep­
tical about that claim since Pakistan does not have a 
nuclear power plant that uses enriched uranium fuel and may 
not for years. Should, as expected, Pakistan face a strong 
Western political rebuff, India believes she may well 
accept a "basement capability" which is the ability to make 
a weapon quickly without testing. European intelligence 
reports that China may have given Pakistan the weapons
technology in exchange for centrifuge enrichment tech- 
10nology.
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India
Obviously, India has weapons technology —  she has 
proven it —  but fizzle material is another matter. Most 
of the plutonium 239 that India now produces (about 10 
kilograms per year) is consumed in research. A weapon of 
the Hiroshima/Nagasaki class requires 6-8 kilos. India 
is about to put a fast breeder reactor on line, designated 
the R-5. This reactor will produce up to 100 kilos of 
U-239 per year, enough to build 12 nuclear weapons. The 
Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis believes that it 
would require only a matter of weeks to fabricate bombs, 
once a decision had been made to do so. India's nuclear 
technology has been oriented toward generation of energy, 
not weapons; the weapons capability has been a spinoff. 
Money is not seen to be a problem in the production of 
weapons. India's first bomb, in 1974, cost about $400,000 
to build. After the fast breeder reactor is producing plu­
tonium in India, the estimates of weapons cost vary from 
$30,000-$180,000. In contrast, India is spending $20 
million a copy for the French Mirage 2000 fighter air­
craft.
Before her death, Mrs. Gandhi told the annual con­
ference of naval commanders that a Pakistani bomb would 
pose a great threat to India. With this in mind, it might 
seem that India may make a preemptive strike to remove the 
Pakistani threat. However, the "surgical" strike is not
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considered a reasonable option by Indian officials since 
the Pakistani nuclear facility is some 70 miles from the 
Indian border, whereas Indian facilities are far closer to 
the Pakistani border. Thus, India offers many more 
’’nuclear hostages” than Pakistan. Major General D. K.
Palit, now retired and a writer on strategic affairs be­
lieves that Pakistan is doing in 1984 what India did in
121974, telling the world that it can make a bomb. He 
says:
"Pakistan doesn't have to go the whole route, be­
cause the scientific and intelligence grapevines 
have picked up evidence that it can succeed.
Both countries now have the capability to make 
it, but I don't think either will. They don't 
need to, the state of uncertainty suits their 
strategic needs well e n o u g h . ”13
Israel
Barbed wire fences, no trespassing signs and sen­
tries on hilltops keeping passers-by at a distance —  
these are all part of what is believed to be the heart of 
the Israeli nuclear weapons facility, known as the Dimona 
nuclear reactor. If one is to believe that the Israelis 
have in fact developed nuclear weapons, then they have done 
so without all the trouble of international uproar and re­
gardless of all the international safeguards provided by the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would seem that 
France is the culprit that has passed the atomic secrets to 
the Israelis in the form of plans for a reprocessing plant.
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They may also have agreed to reprocess fuel from the 
Dimona reactor and ship it back to Israel. Meanwhile, the 
Israelis may have acquired some highly enriched uranium 
from a U.S. company during the late 1960s. With what would 
then be a wealth of fizzle material, it is postulated by 
many experts (and Israeli officials obliquely allude to the 
fact) that Israel may have acquired an arsenal of perhaps 
20 nuclear warheads by now. (This is based on conserva­
tive estimates as to what would be possible if production
were conducted on a nominal basis over the last two decades 
14at Dimona.)
Some advocate that the Israelis overtly build and 
stockpile nuclear weapons. They say that this would tend 
to stabilize the Middle East. Yet, the Israeli people see 
it differently. They feel that this course may keep the 
U.S. from being so free with military aid during times of 
crisis. More importantly, they have a hard time envision­
ing using the nuclear weapons in a border war of attrition. 
In the meantime, there are very real economic pressures for
them to do something pretty dramatic to reduce the cost of
15maintaining such a large conventional standing force.
South Africa
South Africa, like India, is not a signatory of the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and, like India, it seems 
that they too, have developed a nuclear weapon capability.
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The country's Koeberg nuclear power plant (a breeder 
reactor), opened this year and produces enough plutonium 
for a nuclear bomb every one or two weeks. Another such 
plant is being built, and South Africa also has a pilot 
nuclear fuel enrichment plant in addition to mines that 
make it the third largest producer of uranium in the world. 
At first blush, one may ask, "So what?" What are they 
going to use a bomb for even if they have one? Good point, 
and the South African official echo the refrain. "South 
Africa wants nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only. 
We do not possess nuclear weapons." South Africa probably 
has the most advanced nuclear program in the developing 
world. Their principle threat lies from within —  the 
twenty million strong disenfranchised black population. 
"Where would we drop a bomb anyway?" asks a government 
spokesman. Some outsiders believe that the government is 
slightly paranoid in that it continually warns of an immi­
nent onslaught being orchestrated by the Soviet Union.
This obsession has caused the government to be the brunt 
of much humor. A joke being circulated in the country has 
the President going to a fortune teller and asking if 
whites will still be ruling South Africa 50 years from now? 
"Yes," the fortune teller reassures him, "and what will be 
the price of a loaf of bread fifty years from now?" he 
asks. "Not much," reassures the fortune teller, "only 10 
rubles." If jokes of government paranoia abound, can we
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take lightly the fact that that sanie government may have
its finger on the nuclear trigger.
Analysts say that a nuclear bomb may be viewed as
a deterrent in the worst case scenario where a combination
of outside forces are attacking South Africa at the same
17time that there is internal unrest.
Again, as with the Indians, the Pakistanis and the 
Israelis, we have a situation where the fear of the unknown 
(keeping their foes guessing) is more useful politically 
and diplomatically than definitely and overtly having the 
nuclear weapons. And, again, the government can wring con­
cessions out of the Western countries who do not want the 
South Africans to openly build and stockpile nuclear wea­
ponry. The Western countries have little leverage over the 
South Africans since what few pieces of the nuclear puzzle 
they may have lacked have been given or sold to them by 
either the U.S., France or West Germany. It was in 1961 
that South Africa built its first nuclear reactor, using 
U.S. technology. Later, South Africa, which is vulnerable
to an embargo by OPEC, hired a French company to build two
18more nuclear reactors for them.
The U. S. has tried to keep control over the en­
richment process by taking South African uranium, enriching 
it and shipping it back. However, in 1975, the South 
Africans opened their own enrichment plant ; they apparently 
got the technology from the West Germans. The U.S. then
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suspended supplies of enriched uranium. As a result, the 
South Africans were not able to fuel their new nuclear 
power station (the enrichment plant can produce enough 
enriched fuel for two to three bombs a year, but not enough 
for the commercial power plants.) Since then, the Reagan 
Administration has quietly eased rules on nuclear coopera­
tion with South Africa and sales of enriched uranium have 
resumed, albeit not U.S. uranium (That would be against 
the law passed in 1978.) This uranium sold to South Africa 
was enriched in France.
The U. S. Impotence
Until the mid-1970s, there was little effort to 
achieve an international consensus on handling nuclear ex­
ports. In both fuel-cycle and reactor manufacture, the 
United States was so dominant that its policies alone 
seemed to count.
Other countries engaging in nuclear trade did not 
seem to raise many eyebrows; for example, France with 
Israel and Spain,West Germany with Argentina, and Canada 
with India and Pakistan. The thought that developing
nations might one day have the ability or the desire to
20possess nuclear weapons was not taken too seriously.
This laissez-faire atmosphere continued even when 
those same suppliers began to challenge the U.S. nuclear 
industrial supremacy in the last 1960s and early 1970s.
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The rise in anti-nuclear sentiment coincided with a series 
of events that caused an abrupt change in U.S. policy (pro­
posed U.S. deals with Israel and Egypt, the Indian explo­
sion in 1974, the French and West German agreements to 
sell reprocessing technologies to Pakistan, South Korea 
and Brazil). As a result. Congress passed the 1978 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Total bans were placed on 
the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. 
Countries that refused to accept total safeguards were 
warned that they would receive no further trade. Even 
existing contracts were subject to cancellation retroac­
tively. Thus, the United States attempted to unilaterally
put a halt to the spread of nuclear capabilities and bring
21other supplies into line with its restrictive policies.
Prior to the Act of 1978, the United States 
attempted to influence the suppliers of nuclear technology 
when it hosted the London Suppliers Club meeting in 1975 
by attempting to seek unanimity on future export policy.
The Club initially consisted of Canada, France, West 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and 
the Soviet Union. They were later joined by Belgium, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Sweden and Switzerland. Canada had already uni­
laterally imposed its own seIf-restrictions on trade (since 
Canada felt responsible for India's bomb). The main task 
was to convince the Western Europeans that restrictions
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were neceesary. The U.S. was only partially successful, 
and the Club finally drew up a list of sensitive items 
and "guidelines" which were agreed to by the members. The
force of this agreement was basically that of an honor
, 22 code.
The Library of Congress Congressional Research
Service voiced concern over the NRC's ability to stand up
to Presidential pressure when U.S. nuclear aid is promised
to a country as a carrot to gain their cooperation with
U. S. foreign policy. Would White House pressures force
23the NRC to approve the required licenses without delay?
Reagan's China Policy
The Administration’s delay in forwarding the coop­
erative agreement which was announced by President Reagan 
during his visit to China in April, 1984, leaves Congress 
in suspense, the Chinese piqued and U.S. nuclear companies 
stalled as to their plans and aspirations. The major hitch 
seems to be whether the Chinese have given assistance to 
Pakistan in its program to develop nuclear weapons. Re­
ports have indicated that the Chinese have aided 
Pakistan's uranium enrichment efforts. This would, of 
course, violate the premises of the Nuclear Non-prolifera­
tion Treaty and would, therefore, provoke strong opposition 
in Congress to the cooperative agreement with China. A key 
question has been the degree to which the U.S. negotiators
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obtained Chinese assent to safeguards to prevent the trans­
fer of nuclear materials and technology to countries that 
do not have nuclear weapons.
A statement from the Chinese foreign ministry indi­
cated that the Chinese have no intention to make formal
24commitments to non-proliferation.
When President Reagan announced that the agreement 
would be initialed, he indicated that the way was being 
cleared for American companies to win contracts to build 
a dozen nuclear power plants, worth some $20 billion over 
the next two decades. Enthusiasm was voiced by the top 
U. S. vendors. Combustion Engineering, General Electric, 
Bechtel, Stone & Webster and Westinghouse, but they were 
not so optimistic about the market potential. Westinghouse 
executives estimate that China's purchases will not exceed
OK$6 billion to $7 billion.^
In the background is the awareness that China has 
every intention of achieving nuclear self-sufficiency and 
the capability to be an international supplier of nuclear 
technology. West inghouse officials have expressed con­
fidence about competing for Chinese business. The com­
pany's pressurized water reactor has been the dominant de­
sign in the nuclear export market, and the Chinese are
said to regard Westinghouse as technologically the strong-
26est organization in international nuclear trade."
The non-proliferation issue may be out of the hands
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of the United States or its contractors in the case of 
China, since Westinghouse faces strong competition both 
domestically and particularly from the French and the West 
German vendors. In addition to the nuclear technology, 
financing is expected to be an important factor, and the 
U.S. companies worry that, with the aid of their govern­
ments, the French and the Germans may be able to offer a
27more attractive package.
Senator William Proxmire complains that the Chinese 
have given nuclear help to nations like South Africa. He 
says,
"The Reagan Administration has turned a blind eye 
toward the long record of Chinese disregard for 
nuclear non-proliferation. What we have here is 
an agreement by wink and by nod. This is the 
worst kind of agreement-one that is given orally, 
subject to translation problems, not even clear 
as to tense or t i m i n g . "28
Senator Jesse Helms states, "I have a suspicion this whole
thing is being orchestrated to bail out the nuclear power
industry from its own foibles. I just don't think that
29Red China is the appropriate vehicle."
The industry seems to think that the Chinese will 
play the U.S. companies off against the French and the 
Germans. "They may buy a plant or two, plus engineering 
and technical assistance, enough to start manufacturing 
their own plants." The French have negotiated with the 
Chinese for six years now and are about to close a deal. The 
Chinese know how hard up the U.S. nuclear industry is and
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says one nuclear manufacturer, "I imagine they'll be look-
30ing for pretty good terms."
The French Nuclear Industry
The recession in the nuclear industry has hit 
France quite hard, economically and politically. This is 
causing the French to act irresponsibly in the area of 
nuclear proliferation. The industry has become a signifi­
cant part of their economy, and reductions in its activity 
has a strong impact on other sectors such as steel and con­
struction. Since the industry is largely state owned, it
is less flexible and reducing its capacity has many politi-
31cal ramifications.
Finding new reactor orders on the international 
market has understandably become increasingly important to 
the country. France's nuclear industry derives consider­
able strength from the scale of its domestic nuclear pro­
gram; yet, in some ways, this puts it at a disadvantage 
internationally. Partly as a result of making its tech­
nology uniquely French, France has placed its customers 
outside of the network of technological alliances that
have evolved around U.S. and West German power plant pro-
, 32ducers.
France's market share since 1965 has been small: 
six reactors sold to Belgium, South Africa and South Korea, 
compared to the 50 units the United States has sold to 11
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countries. It is not well positioned to play the multi­
national game in the international market place and faces 
considerable barriers to entry in export markets where 
local industries have already been captured by other 
suppliers. Consequently, France has increasingly been 
turning to the Third World nations that have not yet been 
technologically influenced by other suppliers and has 
disregarded the London Club guidelines and (since it
never was a signatory) the Nuclear Non-proliferation
33Treaty full-scope safeguards.
Since the 1978 Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, the
U.S. has not had its traditional sway in the international
market, and considerable erosion of its market strength
has occurred. Pockets of industrial expertise have sprung
up in places such as in Belguim, Italy, South Korea and
Spain. These will tend to use joint ventures to expand
into the void left by the U.S. nuclear industry's forced
withdrawal. Should the U.S. re-emerge as a factor in this
market, these countries will likely trade without hesitation
34in the gray area of the world market.
The Soviet Block
By the 1990s, the Soviet Block countries will have 
invested a tremendous amount in nuclear technology and will 
be ready and willing to export it. It is interesting to 
note that the Soviets have shown no compunctions about
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offering reactors and nuclear fuels to countries outside 
the Non-proliferation Treaty when it suited their foreign 
policy interests, as in the recent case of Pakistan.
The Third World
The more advanced Third World countries are devel­
oping their nuclear technology at a rapid rate and, as 
their capacity grows, so does their propensity to export 
their new found knowledge. Most notable is China and the 
six quasi-nuclear countries outside of the Treaty which 
have attracted so much attention among proliferation 
watchers. These countries will not be competitive in the 
area of large reactor systems but will soon be able to 
offer a fairly comprehensive range of nuclear goods and 
services. After all the threats and denied assistance in 
developing their nuclear capability, they are unlikely to 
embrace the London Suppliers Club guidelines much less 
U.S. policies.^
The Arms Race
The U.S.- Soviet arms race continues to make
attempts at non-proliferation seem hypocritical, at best.
So long as Article VI of the Non-proliferation Treaty, in
which the signatories pledged themselves to arms control
and disarmament, is being so blatantly violated there
seems little hope that the Third World rejectionists of
37that treaty will be persuaded to join.
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Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: "Each 
of the Parties of the Treaty undertakes to pursue 
negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to the cessation of the nuclear disarmament, 
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control.
Indeed, the concern now is not so much the expan­
sion of the treaty but the prevention of its collapse. If 
the international community could agree on a truly com­
prehensive test ban treaty, there would be some hope of 
ending the massive nuclear proliferation that is occurring 
in the world. However, since the U.S. and the Ü.S.S.R. do 
not seem to be able to stop the arms race, what credibility 
can a test ban have with other countries. It seems that 
the most promising of all non-proliferation measures —  a
comprehensive test ban treaty —  has run into a brick wall
39in Moscow and Washington. (Note, as of this writing, there 
seems to be a thawing of East/West relations.)
To Show and Tell or Not?
There may be a ray of light in the unhappy thought 
of nuclear proliferation, the fact is that six countries 
have apparently attained their goal of nuclear weapons 
options and are clearly in a quandary as to what to do with 
them. Israel and South Africa show no sign of wanting to 
test or to deploy them —  they are apparently content to be 
able to threaten to do so. The relations between India and 
Pakistan have improved, and both countries are understand­
ably reluctant to engage in a regional nuclear arms race.
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The government of Argentina has decided to bring their 
nuclear power program under civilian control, which may 
open the way for stronger nuclear arms control accord in 
Latin America.
We have a situation that is unstable but not be­
anyond recall.
Subnations
What about terrorists and the concerns for nuclear 
non-proliferation? These concerns are real and must be 
addressed: First, the technology required to detonate a
nuclear weapon is on the streets, but the availability of 
fizzle material is what keeps nuclear weapons out of the 
hands of terrorists, gangsters or rogue nations. Clearly 
though, as commercial nuclear power is being placed in the 
hands of more and more countries, the availability of 
fizzle material is more readily at hand. If we consider 
the general availability of information about weapons, it 
is prudent to assume that anyone who has weapons grade 
material is capable of using it. For this reason, inter­
national and national entities take measures to make acqui­
sition of weapons materials difficult, either diplomati­
cally or physically. The effectiveness of these measures
41is the question.
There is concern that, sooner or later, terrorist 
groups will construct atomic bombs clandestinely for their
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own purposes, or criminals may divert nuclear materials for
radioactive blackmail. Associated with this problem is the
prospect of living in a police state designed to minimize
the annual number of cities destroyed by terrorists'
A-bombs. Furthermore, by selling nuclear technology to
all comers, we assure that dozens of countries will possess
enough nuclear material to manufacture bombs by the end of
the century. At least 20 percent of these countries will
actually develop weapons from the materials we have
supplied. If the ultimate threat to public health is
nuclear war, we may be writing a death warrant for society
42by boosting nuclear reactor sales worldwide.
The problem for a nation or terrorist group is not 
so much being able to get the weapons grade material.
Under agreements that allow nations the use of nuclear tech­
nology, they also have legal or extralegal rights of access 
to the material to fuel them. Terrorist groups or gangs­
ters would only have to embezzle or raid to get hold of 
the material. For these groups to have the rather elabo­
rate facilities and highly skilled personnel necessary to 
refine the reactor fuel or the spent fuel (which does con­
tain plutonium) is difficult to imagine. It is not so dif­
ficult to imagine a nation having such capabilities. Normal 
reactor fuel is not sufficiently enriched to allow the 
formation of a super critical mass. However, if a nation 
owns an enrichment plant or a reprocessing plant, it
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clearly has at its disposal both the materials and the 
facilities to produce weapons grade material. The prolif­
eration of reprocessing plants adds to the danger but seems
necessary in light of each recipient's desire to maximize
4uranium utilization.
Conclusions to be drawn from Chapter Three:
1) It seems that the question of whether to export nuclear 
technology is moot. The fact is that once a country has 
developed the resources necessary to support the technology, 
invariably there is insufficient demand in that country to 
fully utilize these resources. The only alternative then 
that will allow the country to keep the industry going is
to export the technology. The United States was the first 
to export nuclear technology, but had that not been the 
case, others would have developed it and exported it.
2) Some of the dangers of nuclear proliferation include 
increased likelihood of rogue nations or terrorist groups 
using nuclear blackmail to get their way. Another danger 
is that nuclear war may erupt where a country is about to 
be overwhelmed by a neighboring country.
3) Some countries are apparently developing a nuclear 
weapons capability in an effort to quietly intimidate their 
neighbors with their potential might and thus reduce the 
likelihood of incursions by those neighbors into their 
territory. Of concern to the rest of the world is the
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question of national responsibility in the restraint of 
its use.
4) There has not been meaningful effort by the ’’Nuclear 
Club" to restrain proliferation of technology to developing 
countries. Efforts to do so have been diluted by the unre­
strained arms race between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The world is just not taking the proliferation 
problem seriously and is unlikely to do so until the super­
powers do. Each of the Club members seem more intent on 
their own immediate profit from the sale of technology.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Sociotechnical Issues 
Discussion
The central issues of this Chapter:
1) The public attitude about nuclear power.
2) What the social cost of nuclear power is.
3) The externalities of nuclear power for the countries 
receiving the technology.
4) A comparison of "normal emissions" of radioactive 
gasses compared to background radiation in terms of 
dosage and danger.
5) What a"worst case" nuclear accident in a reactor would 
be like.
6) Other public perceptions of nuclear externalities. 
Radiation
The accidents at Three Mile Island (TMI) and 
Browns Ferry left many wondering about the safety of 
nuclear energy worldwide. The long term damage to the 
health of the population in the vicinity of TMI is still 
not fully known. (This is due to the less than perfect 
understanding of the effects of low level radiation on the 
human body.) Radiation, even in the smallest doses, can
72
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
cause cancer. It can produce genetic defects that could be 
passed on for all the generations of human beings to come. 
It can act as a virtually permanent pollutant —  one that 
can never be "cleaned up." It is being added to the envi­
ronment deliberately through ordinary operation of nuclear 
plants and their attendant fuel cycle. Nuclear power and 
weapons production is the second biggest source of man- 
made radiation. (The greatest cause of man-made radia­
tion is nuclear weapons detonations.) At every step of 
the nuclear fuel cycle, cancer-causing poisons escape into 
the air, water and soil. Radioactive fallout —  the per­
manent calling card left behind by atmospheric nuclear 
explosions —  is now factored in as part of the "natural 
background radiation.
In addition to an accident such as occurred at TMI, 
the long-term effects of nuclear stations affecting our 
environment requires consideration. Table 4-1 shows the 
probable who1e-body dose from a typical nuclear power plant 
on a seashore. In the United States, the upper limit of the 
dose on the boundary of nuclear power stations is now 
limited to at most 5 mrem (millirems) per year. Because 
nuclear power stations are point sources of radiation, this 
limits the dose to the population within 6 miles of nuclear 
power stations to approximately .6 mrem/yr and within 50 
miles to approximately .01 mrem/yr.
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Table 4-1
Probable Dose from Nuclear Power Station
Dose 
mrems/yr.
At boundary of station.......................... 5
Population within 6 miles of station.........  0.6
Eating fish and shellfish, 50 grams/day 
caught at exit of condenser discharge 
canal..........................................  2.5
Swimming 3 hrs/day, 120 day/yr. in
effluent condenser discharge canal........  0.03
Swimming 3 hrs/day, 120 day/yr. at shore 
areas on either side of nuclear
power St at ion................................. 0.006
Average natural background radiation
in the United states......................... 105.00
(2) Source : L. D. Hamilton,"Biological Significance
of Environmental Radiation: Calculation of Risk,” pre­
sented at the American Physical Symposium on Biological 
Significance of Environmental Radiation, Washington, D.C., 
April, 1971.
Doses calculated for Millstone Point, Connecticut, 
a power station containing two reactors about 1300 Mw. 
on the north shore of Long Island Sound. Doses at the 
boundary of the station and to the population within six 
miles are doses accumulated by individuals remaining for 
24 hrs/day and 365 days/yr at the boundary or in the open 
within 6 miles of the station.
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As seen from Table 4-2, the risk of death by auto 
is about 1000 times that of leukemia under the uppermost 
limits of radiation after 35 years of exposure from the 
nuclear power station. After 35 years of exposure, the 
risk of death under the average conditions of the popula­
tion within 6 miles of the plant; i.e., the population at 
the greatest risk, is one ten-thousandth that of being 
slain by an automobile. Since the total risk of dying 
from cancer at those doses is approximately five times 
that of the incidence of leukemia, the total risk of dying 
from cancer at those doses is then still infinitesimal. 
Moreover, even taking into account that a fetus may be 
approximately 10 times more susceptible to the oncologenic 
effects of radiation than the average member of the popu­
lation, one appreciates that the fetus normally remains 
un utero for less than one year. Thus, the risk to a fetus 
will be approximately one-third that calculated for the
3general population after a 35-year exposure.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment
The actual quantitative results on the estimated 
public risks of nuclear power, while important, are per­
haps the least useful results of Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA). Enough studies have been completed by 
now to tell us that the estimated risks from nuclear 
reactor accidents are quite small.
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Table 4-2 
Risk of Death 
Per Year for an Individual
Risk Probability
Accidental Death* 57 out of 100,000 0.00057
Death in Motor Vehicle* 26.7 out of 100,000 0.00027
Death from Heart Disease* 364 out of 100,000 0.00364
Death from cancer 157 out of 100,000 0.00157
Death from all spontaneous 
Leukemias* 67 out of 1,000,000 0.000067
Leukemia after 1000 mrems 
Whole Body Radiation** 1 out of 1,000,000 0.000001
Leukemia after natural 
radiation (35 years)** 3.7 out of 1,000,000 0.0000037
Leukemia after living 
near power reactors 
(35 years at boundary 
site eating fish and 
swimming)** 2.6 out of 10,000,000 0.00000026
Leukemia after living near 
power reactors (35 
years-general popu­
lation within 6 miles 
of site. )** 2.1 out of 100,000,000 0.000000021
* Risk of death per year from an individual in the 
United States.
** Risk of leukemia represents an additional risk of 
death to be added to that from "all spontaneous leukemias". 
Similarly, risk of death from all additional cancers would 
be about five times the data shown for cancer above.
(4) Source: L. D. Hamilton, "Biological Significance
of Environmental Radiation: Calculation of Risk," presented
at the American Physical Symposium on Biological 
Significance of Environmental Radiation, Washington, D.C., 
April 1971.
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Engineering insights are the most important bene­
fits of PRA studies. The most general of these is the 
entirely new way of thinking about reactor safety in a 
logic structure that transcends normal design and regula­
tory processes. PRA thinking introduces much-needed real­
ism into safety evaluations. Deterministic thinking, in 
contrast, although it has served society well, often masks
5important matters.
Figure 4-1 depicts an event tree such as would be 
used by engineers to evaluate the consequences of a pipe 
break that might lead to a release of radioactivity. 
Analysts assign probabilities to each possible event in 
the sequence. Then, having satisfied themselves that all 
the probabilities in a sequence are independent of each 
other, they multiply them to obtain the overall chance 
that a particular sequence will occur.
PRA concepts can help improve understanding in many 
applications across a broad spectrum of activities, includ­
ing engineering, licensing, and operations. The following 
are among its most important general insights :
1) Contrary to what was previously thought, core 
meltdowns would not necessarily be catastro­
phic in terms of public risk. In fact, PRAs 
show that, if a core meltdown occurs, there is 
only a small chance that the containment build­
ing will also fail in such a way that a large
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amount of radioactivity will be released.
2) The notorious "China Syndrome," in which the 
nuclear fuel melts through the containment 
basemat beneath the reactor, does not pose a 
significant risk to the public. Not only is 
this scenario unlikely, an analysis shows that, 
even if it happened, most of the dangerous 
materials would be retained in the concrete 
and the soil. Releases of radioactive mate­
rials from this event would be very much 
smaller than if the building itself had been 
ruptured.
3) Current reactor designs provide great capa­
bility to reduce the consequences of poten­
tial accidents that are more severe than those 
considered in the licensing process.
4) The most significant accident sequences in 
pressurized-water reactors in common use in 
the United States do not result from large 
pipe ruptures, as previously assumed. Breaks 
in large coolant pipes are unlikely, and 
reactors have been specifically designed to 
cope with them. The overall risk of accidents 
that result from ruptures in small pipes and 
subsequent failures of safety systems turns 
out to be greater.
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5) "Transient events," when the power output 
of the reactor is being changed, also pose 
potentially significant risks when combined 
with additional failures in safety systems.
6) The most significant accident sequences in 
boiling water reactors do not involve loss 
of coolant, but stem rather from transient 
events.
7) The importance of stong containment buildings 
and reliable safety features, such as the emer­
gency coolant-injection and heat-removal sys­
tems, has been highlighted and quantified by 
PRA.
8) In general, human factors —  errors in testing, 
maintaining and controlling plants —  account 
for a significant, but not dominant, part of 
the public risk that might arise from reactor 
accidents.®
Worst Case Accident
The worst case accident is postulated to result in 
instant death for all exposed within ten miles downwind of 
the accident, heavy contamination of the land within 200 
miles downwind of the site and loss of use of crops and 
animal products within 1,000 miles downwind. Depending 
upon the location of population centers in relation to the
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wind pattern, this could result in 3,000 immediate fatali­
ties and 45,000 cancers or radiation sicknesses.
This study of the likelihood of a nuclear accident, 
which was accomplished by the Oak Ridge Laboratory, has 
been updated in draft form on July 1983. The report con­
cludes that the chance of a severe core damage accident was 
1 in 4,000 per reactor-year of operation. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRG) director, Robert Minogue, said, 
"Even at this improved frequency rate, there is still a
roughly 10 percent chance that a severe core-damage acci-
8dent will happen in the next five years."
The Sandia National Laboratory released its report 
on the possible consequences of an accident at 91 reactor 
sites in the United States in November 1982. These figures 
indicated that, for example, 100,000 persons might die 
within a year from a worst-case accident at the Salem 
plant in New Jersey, or that property damage might reach 
$300 billion in the area near the Indian Point plant in 
New York. The NRC countered this with a study that showed 
the probability of an accident at Indian Point that would 
kill only one person immediately (not a worst case acci-
9dent) is only 1 in 1.7 million years of operation.
It appears that the industry and the NRC seem to be 
trying to convey a sense of security to the public that 
cannot be justified. The fact is that the likelihood of 
a serious accident cannot yet be precisely determined.
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Recall that the types of accidents occurring at TMI and at 
Browns Ferry, Alabama, were officially deemed "not 
credible.
Ironically, anti-nuclear people show much apprehen­
sion for workers in the nuclear industry but little for 
workers in other industries. The hollowness of the pro­
testations of the self-styled "concerned" persons is shown 
by the following death statistics: e.g., coal-face workers 
(actual dead 420. . . expected 12 = 35.00 times the ex­
pected amount). Company Directors (actual dead 425 . . .
expected 54 = 7.87 times the expected amount). This com­
pares to surprisingly low deaths for workers in British
nuclear reactors where deaths from all causes were only
11.75 percent of expected.
Dr. Robert L. DuPont, M.D., after the TMI accident, 
at the invitation of the Media Institute, a non-profit 
organization devoted to improving the quality of media 
coverage of business and economic affairs, reviewed 13 hours 
of TV news videotapes. These tapes contained all the news 
stories regarding nuclear power broadcast between August 5, 
1968, and April 20, 1979 -- one month after the TMI acci­
dent. After the review. Dr. Dupont’s impression was that 
fear was the motif of the entire series of nuclear news 
broadcasts. The driving force in the nuclear energy issue 
is not economics, not technology, not energy production.
It is fear! He stated that the public debate will certainly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
hinge on fear and that, right now, the tide appears to be 
running with those who are encouraging that fear. He felt 
that a phobic is at the roots of the fear, a malignant di­
sease of "what ifs." The phobic thinking process is a 
spiraling chain reaction of "what ifs." Each "what if" 
leads to another. Moreover, phobic thinking travels down 
the worst possible branchings of each of the "what ifs" 
until the person is overwhelmed with the potentials for 
disaster. Often these worst-case eventualities remain only 
partly articulated, even to the phobic himself. When Dr. 
DePont reviewed the tapes, he noted time and again that the 
newscasters would continually go down those "what if, 
worst-case" branches. An example that Dr. DuPont gave of 
this attitude was when a reporter talked about a study in 
Washington State which reported of one scientist's estima­
tion that, of persons who worked at a nuclear facility over 
many years, there were 30 to 50 "extra" deaths from cancer 
out of 4,000 deaths from all causes, which may have been
due to something -- probably radiation —  at the nucelar 
12plant.
The reporters who covered the story asked questions
and used a tone of voice which carried the message; "Well,
my God, isn't that terrible?" The scientist said,
"No this is the risk that comes from that activity. 
People ought to know the facts but you should not 
close the plant because of that additional risk.
. . . The point is that people need straight forward
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information about nuclear plants and alternative 
sources of energy including the positive and nega­
tive aspects of those sources."13
Dangers of Other Technology
Not in an effort to minimize the real or perceived 
dangers of a nuclear plant, but instead to put those dan­
gers into a perspective with other forms of energy current­
ly in use, we must look at what happened at Mexico City on 
the 19th of November, 1984. That disaster is ususually 
germane to our discussion. An article from The Wall 
Street Journal is filled with so much information relative 
to this chapter that I will take the liberty of quoting it 
verbatim.
The explosion of four tanks containing liquefied 
gas on the outskirts of Mexico City Monday morning 
was most importantly a human tragedy, the kind 
of disaster that strikes suddenly and unexpectedly, 
leaving us all in shock as we contemplate its horrors. 
As of midweek, the death toll had risen above 300 
and the numbers of injured and homeless were much 
larger still. (Business Week, December 24, 1984, 
fixed the toll at 452 people killed.)
But beyond this reminder of the capriciousness 
of fate, there seems to us another lesson to be 
drawn. Although we take precautions in the use of 
all technologies, older technologies often pose 
greater danger to human life than new ones. This 
is exactly the reverse of the argument we hear so 
often from those intellectual elites who make it 
their business to raise fears about where advances 
in technology are leading us.
Liquefied gas is a relatively simple technology 
when compared with, let us say, nuclear energy. 
Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is propane or butane 
kept liquid under pressure. This so-called bottled 
gas is ubiquitous, particularly in rural areas. It 
is an extremely convenient way of storing fuel, and 
the safeguards built into handling equipment keep it 
well within the realm of acceptable risk.
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Liquefied natural gas (LNG) presents somewhat 
greater difficulties, in part because a very low 
temperature is required for liquefaction and be­
cause the usual goal of this technology is to store 
and transport large quantities of gas in circum­
stances where it is not possible or practical to 
distribute it directly from the wells by pipeline.
As the Mexico City explosion demonstrated, there 
is real risk and quite obviously, a need to review 
safety precautions in large-scale storage facili­
ties. The U.S. General Accounting Office, an arm 
of Congress, in July 1978, issued a three-volume 
report discussing the risks of storage and trans­
portation of liquid gases, even going so far as to 
suggest that such facilities be restricted, as nearly 
as possible, to lightly populated areas.
This report created no great hysteria, certainly 
nothing on the scale of the uproar that followed the 
Three Mile Island nuclear power facilities acci­
dent in March, 1979. Yet the TMI accident, which 
was the product of incredible operational inepti­
tude, resulted in no loss of life and not even any 
risk to life from the small amounts of radioactive 
material released. The record shows that liquid gas 
occasionally kills, but nuclear generation, a much 
more complex technology, has harmed almost no one. 
Obviously, there is much more to the anti-nuke 
movement than mere considerations of safety. [Note: 
a January 10th, 1985, newscast indicated that the 
cancer rate near TMI is seven times the national 
level.]
Other comparisons are available. Space pioneers 
had a far better safety record than pioneers of 
the air age. Modern technology, partly because of 
its complexity and difficulty, requires elaborate 
organization, a far cry from the single-handed 
adventures of the early technological pioneers. 
Computers have made it possible to simulate real- 
world accidents and to thus remove risks. The 
great concentrations of capital and manpower on 
single ventures have made it economically feasible 
to over-design equipment to build in fail-safe 
"redundancies".
In short, modern industrial technology on the 
whole yields greater safety along with its other 
benefits. Disasters such as the one in Mexico City 
should thus be a spur to, not a brake on, technolo­
gical development.^4
Not related to energy, but certainly related to
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older technology, was the horror of the India poison gas
release that occurred on the 3rd of December, 1984. The
gas, closely related in its effects on the body to the war
gas. Phosgene, kills by causing the lungs to fill with
fluid. At 1:00 a.m., the methyl isocyanate gas had begun
leaking from an underground storage tank at a Union Carbide
pesticide plant in a poor area of Bhopal India. The leak
was stopped after only 40 minutes but, by that time, as
many as 200,000 people were affected. Twenty-five hundred
were dead before two days passed, and at least 20,000 may
suffer serious after-effects such as sterility and loss of 
15eyesight.
What the Mexico City and the Bhopal accidents point 
out loud and clear is that most technologies have the 
potential to be dangerous and, given the right circum­
stances, can certainly kill. We need to be quite aware 
of this possibility and review existing as well as pro­
posed siting and procedures for all potentially dangerous 
industries as they relate to exposure and risk. Perhaps 
the nuclear industry has been singled out for scrutiny for 
too long, at the expense of other (more dangerous?) tech­
nologies .
An Indian government official expressed an emerging 
concern recently. "There has been competition to have an 
atomic reactor or a Union Carbide unit in as many areas as 
possible without considering the consequences. The entire
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policy toward aligning with multi-nationals must be 
reconsidered.
Russian Nuclear Disaster in the Urals
In 1958, there was a nuclear disaster of some 
magnitude in the Soviet Union. It was an explosion involv­
ing concentrated waste produced by military reactors and 
stored somewhere underground. The radioactive fission pro­
ducts which had accumulated over many years were released 
explosively to the surface of the earth and carried by the 
wind for dozens of kilometers.
There were no large cities in the main contaminated 
area, but there were villages and workers' settlements. 
Because of the suddenness of the explosion and the dis­
persion of the radioactivity, the levels of contamination 
in the various localities were only determined after some 
delay. The secrecy surrounding nuclear activities ham­
pered timely radiation monitoring. The first serious 
evacuation attempts were made after several days, and then 
only in the settlement closest to the site of the explo­
sion. Subsequently, symptoms of radiation sickness began 
to appear in the more distant areas. Necessary treatment 
techniques had not been adequately developed at that time. 
The evacuation affected several thousand persons (possibly 
tens of thousands), but the number who died of radiation 
sickness remained unknown. The immediate effects of
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such exposure may not be apparent but may be carried to
future generations as the strontium-90 in the bones of
17the exposed affects the reproductive cells.
This Urals disaster represents the only nuclear 
accident of great proportion to have occurred thus far.
It was (as far as can be determined at a distance) due to 
unsophisticated storage of nuclear waste. The explosion 
was really a release of radioactive contamination with 
explosive force, not a nuclear explosion, since such 
materials are not capable of sustaining an uncontrolled 
chain-reaction. We might assume that the heat of radio­
active decay in an underground chamber combined with 
subterranean waters and generated steam whose pressure 
caused the release. Alternatively, there could have been 
a hydrogen explosion caused in a similar manner.
Nuclear Waste
In addition to the possible contamination from a 
nuclear accident, we should examine the nuclear waste 
problem in depth. How serious is this problem? Is it a 
problem?
In fact, radioactivity cannot be artifically de­
stroyed, in contrast to other well known poisons which can 
be burned or rendered harmless by chemical methods. Radio­
activity decays at a rate determined by its own law of 
half-life. The half-life of radioactivity is the time
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taken for the substance to decay to half of its original 
strength; that is, for half of the atoms in it to disin­
tegrate. This may take seconds or thousands of millions 
of years, depending on the type of materials.
This waste problem has become one of the most 
volatile issues surrounding the nuclear fuel cycle. A 
nuclear reactor will build up an enormous inventory of 
radioactive fission products during its operation. Al­
though most of this radioactivity will decay quite rapidly 
after reactor shutdown and removal of spent fuel elements,
a significant fraction of the high-level radioactivity
18induced in the fuel will remain for many years.
Six methods have been proposed for dealing with 
high level nuclear waste: 1) shooting them into space,
2) burning them in breeder reactors, 3) burying them in 
the Antarctic ice sheet, 4) drilling holes 20,000 or so 
feet into the earth and burying them, 5) burying them 
in subseabed deposits, and 6) placing them in under­
ground cavities.
Rocketing waste into space is a handy solution -- 
assuming that the launch is successful and excluding 
costs. The breeder reactor concept died in the U.S. for 
the time being at least, with the Clinch River reactor. 
Besides, breeders still generate waste (albeit, not as 
much as other reactors). The ice sheet burial concept has 
fallen into disfavor because the deposits might not be
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stable over the time periods required. After all, pluto­
nium has a half life of 24,360 years. Deep drilling with 
the necessary large diameter hole is not now within our 
technological capabilities. In fact, only two of the sug­
gested methods seem worthy of further examination as solu­
tions in the immediate future.
Subseabed Disposal
Between the mid-ocean ridges and the continental 
margins, there exists an area that is quite stable geologi­
cally, and studies have been made of burying waste under 
about 15,000 feet of water and approximately 100 feet into 
the sediments there. This would be an extremely stable 
area, seismically. The containers presently available 
for this procedure are estimated to be able to hold their 
contents for as much as 1,000 years, after which time the 
sediments into which the containers were placed would have 
to contain the waste. It has not been established how 
well the sediments would be able to do that and thus keep 
the radioactive waste out of the ocean eco-system. This 
question is being studied, but the best estimate of its 
resolution is about 2020. By that time, the nuclear waste 
problem will be greatly magnified over what it presently
is.2°
Continental Geological Disposal
The construction of the first mined dump for high
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level nuclear waste is already under way near Carlsbad,
New Mexico. The $1 billion Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 
(WIPP) will be a disposal site for military waste and 
could, over the strident objections of New Mexico's Governor, 
Toney Anaya, be used for experimentation with more radio­
active spent fuel. A salt bed is being used and, ulti­
mately, the extent of the underground labyrinth will be 
about 120 acres. There are several problems associated 
with this location and the concept of using salt beds 
in general, but there are problems associated with any con­
cept so far. This seems to be the concept that, for the 
time being, will give us direction. However, the site will
not be operational until about the year 2000, and this
21still leaves us with a serious disposal problem.
The Geologic Isolation System
Related to the continental geological disposal
previously described is geologic isolation. This system
is the primary method of waste disposal being pursued by
the Department of Energy (DOE). Conceptually, the geologic
repository, as a waste isolation system, consists of three
functionally distinct subsystems that interact to provide
multiple natural and man-made barters to the release of
the contained waste into the accessible environment. These
subsystems or components are the waste package, the repo-
22sitory, and the site.
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The waste package includes the waste form itself 
and a system of engineered barriers consisting of a filler 
material (in the case of spent fuel), a high-integrity 
canister, and one or more layers of protective materials 
selected to minimize interactions among the waste, host 
rock, and ground water. During the repository operational 
phase, the waste package provides safe containment of the 
waste material during handling and emplacement operations 
and helps ensure that the waste can be safely retrieved, 
if necessary, from the repository. During the time that 
fission product decay is dominant and radiation and ther­
mal output are high (i.e., 400 to 600 years), the waste 
package will continue to provide containment of the waste, 
delaying initiation and retarding the rate of radionu­
clide release into the ground-water environment. After the 
thermal period, the repository and the site, in conjunc­
tion with the waste packages, provide long-term waste
0*3isolation.
The repository will be much like a conventional 
mine. It incorporates structures to access the underground 
corridors and rooms for waste emplacement and man-made 
barriers to contain and isolate wastes. All site activi­
ties from initial studies and construction through closure
will be performed in a manner that preserves the contain-
24ment and isolation capabilities of the sites selected.
Edwin Wiggin of the Atomic Industrial Forum,
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headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, worries about the 
cost of delays due to "political and social matters" 
rather than technical problems. He feels there is a ten­
dency for "DOE to research a problem to death." Wiggins 
said, "Most of the basic research has been accomplished.
We can make a mistake in looking for the perfect answer 
when an adequate answer is enough."
In Germany and the U.S., efforts are being made to 
deposit nuclear waste in deserted salt mines or rock 
salt formations. However, nobody can predict with any 
certainty what sort of effects concentrated radioactivity 
will have on the rock salt formations over a long period 
of time. Apart from this, the radioactive material could
come into contact with subterranean waters, or tectonic
25changes might take place.
A Department of Energy Study has been completed 
that was quite exhaustive and indicates that invasion of a 
properly conceived subterranean storage facility by an 
outside force (earthquake, etc.) is so minimal as to not 
deserve consideration in the selection of this alterna­
tive. The most likely cause of such intervention was postu­
lated to be man, but even this possibility was too low
26to be of concern.
The government has just released the top candidates 
to become the nation's nuclear waste depository. The sites 
are near Santa Rosa and Ogallala, Texas, in the panhandle;
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Yucca Mountain, on the western edge of Nellis AFB and the 
Nuclear Weapons Test Site in the Southern part of Nevada; 
and finally, Hanford nuclear reservation near Richland, 
Washington. Of these, the Nevada site seems to be the one 
that is ranked first by the government. I can recommend 
the Nevada selection, too. I have flown over it many
times; the nuclear craters are awesome, and the whole area
is already contaminated.
The multibi11ion-doliar underground repository 
will become the final grave for some 70,000 metric tons of 
highly radioactive wastes that will not decay to safe
levels for at least 10,000 years. Acknowledging that none
of the potential sites are supported by popular opinion, 
the government feels that once the magnitude of the safety 
precautions to be taken are understood, the site (as 
selected) will be acccepted. The program is scheduled to 
cost on the order of $20-25 billion.
The top three sites will be put through four to 
five years of intensive "characterization" studies each 
costing $500 million to $1 billion after they are finally 
approved by the President.
Based on the results of the study, whoever is the 
President in 1991 will have the final choice. At that
point, current law allows the chosen state to veto the
-, ^ . 27selection.
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Conclusions to be drawn from this chapter;
1) The public attitude about nuclear energy is distorted 
by the fact that nuclear energy somehow has the same conno­
tation as nuclear weapons. This negative attitude by the 
public has been heightened by the impressions that a 
nuclear plant might explode like a weapon. The worst-case 
accident involving a nuclear plant is significantly less 
dangerous than a nuclear detonation. Valid concern exists 
over the problem of radiation associated with nuclear waste 
material, radiation associated with an accident or radia­
tion associated with proximity to daily nuclear plant 
operations.
2) The social cost of nuclear power is essentially fear of 
the unknown. If it could be stated that a low dose of 
radiation was definitely going to cause a particular effect 
in a certain portion of the population, then that risk 
could be assessed in view of need, and it would be either 
acceptable or not. There are few certainties regarding 
nuclear side effects.
3) The externalities of nuclear energy for countries re­
ceiving the technology are many. The fact that the 
facility, in itself, does not generate jobs for the local 
population is one. There is the dilemma of what to do with 
the nuclear waste. Power grids often have to be rebuilt to 
handle the output of the plants. A dependence is estab­
lished on sources of nuclear fuel. The danger of accident
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or radiation exposure to the population of the country is 
feared. In the case of developing countries, the popula­
tion often is not ready to benefit from the wonders of 
electrical power. This often results in unused capacity 
for nuclear plants. Nuclear energy is highly capital in­
tensive, and the countries that are trying to expand the 
use of that source of power are often debt ridden to begin 
with. The nuclear option does little to improve the situa­
tion .
4) Working in the nuclear industry seems to be little more 
dangerous than working at many other vocations. The major 
thought here is that life in general is hazardous in one 
way or another.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Salient Aspects of the Alternatives 
Discussion 
The central issues of this chapter:
1) The economic costs of nuclear and alternative energy 
sources will be contrasted.
2) The environmental impacts of the nuclear alternatives 
will be evaluated.
3) Conservâtionism and how it applies to the Third World 
nations.
Nuclear Power
The Secretary of Energy, Don Model, has consis­
tently maintained that we must work toward a balanced and 
mixed energy resource system and avoid over-reliance on 
any single energy resource such as the dependence on oil 
which prevailed during the 1970s. Surely, nuclear power 
must join with fossil fuels and renewables such as hydro 
and solar, as an essential element of that mix. Under 
virtually any growth projection, we will need all of the 
power plants currently under construction just to meet 
demand in 1995. In addition, if we are going to replace 
obsolete facilities, even more new generating plants will
99
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
be needed.^
In the interim, with the reduced rate of growth in 
demand for electricity coupled with the "de facto" mora­
torium on nuclear development in the U.S., we should give
further consideration to improved reactor designs and 
2technology.
One of the chief reasons that nuclear power has 
been so appealing to Third World countries in the past is 
the fact that it is relatively insensitive to spatial re­
lationships of fuel or topography such as hydroelectric 
power is. Thus, countries that could not in the past hope 
to have sufficient electrical power for their needs may now 
have it, provided they can afford it! This last point is 
where the sytem is breaking down since many of these coun­
tries cannot service their debt as it is.
Hard, cold economics is now doing to nuclear power 
what thousands of hot blooded demonstrators never could.
It is slowly, painfully shutting down the world's nuclear 
industries. The only countries in which development is 
proceeding at close to the pace planned a decade ago are 
those where there is no semblance of a market test and 
where nuclear power is pushed single-mindedly by a strong 
central government. Private investors who have a choice 
and who must bear the financial responsibility for their 
decisions are steering clear of nuclear power.
Important additional costs may further tip the
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economic scales. The disposal of nuclear wastes and de­
commissioning of old plants are critical problems that 
have yet to be effectively resolved in any country.
(Note: Both of these aspects present significant residual
radiation problems.) Each presents enormous health and 
safety concerns that could affect societies for genera­
tions. Providing remedies will inevitably add to the cost 
of nuclear power. So far waste disposal and decommission­
ing are "uncounted costs," and their potential size can 
only be guessed. Official figures generally show the 
disposal and decommissioning adding 5-10 percent to the 
cost of nuclear power though unofficial estimates range
3up to an additional 50 percent or more.
Nuclear Alternatives
There are a number of new technologies developing 
in nuclear power itself that should be explored, contrary 
to what Philip Bray of General Electric says. Granted, 
he may be correct when he says that the light water tech­
nology is like a thoroughbred horse and only needs a well 
prepared surface to run on rather than a steeplechase full 
of water hazards. Then, again, his views could be con­
sidered proprietary.^
At present, there are two well thought out ideas 
for inherently safe reactors: the "Process Inherent
Ultimately Safe" (PIUS) reactor being developed in Sweden
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and the modular High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) pro­
posed by the U.S. and Germany. Several other concepts 
have been proposed in addition, but none have been taken 
as serious or developed as fully as the PIUS and the modu­
lar HTGRs. Some of the more salient features of each are 
shown.
PIUS. Protection against core meltdown in the 
PIUS reactors would be gained through passive physical 
principles without the intervention of active safety sys­
tems or reactor operators. The protection is effective 
not only against conceivable accidents caused by equipment 
or operator failures but also against external events such 
as earthquakes, sabotage, or attack with conventional 
explosives. A number of technical problems must be 
resolved to prove its operability and commercial worth. A 
demonstration plant could be put into operation in approxi-
5mately 12 years.
HTGR. Without getting too technical, the principal 
advantages of the HTGR are its ease of refueling and eco­
nomical modular design. Refueling may be done while the 
reactor is powered up which is a significant safety advan­
tage. (During a transient condition, such as loss of 
coolant, instead of possible core damage, there is no dan­
ger at all.) This latter feature is why the HTGRs are 
often referred to as "walk away reactors," since an opera­
tor does not have to make an immediate decision under
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stressful conditions and take the chance that it may not be 
the right one.
Economically, the HTGRs may prove to be feasible 
since they allow modular off-site production and incre­
mental installation. Utilities may add an increment of 
power capability when needed and not pay the interest on 
capability that will be needed years hence.
An advantage to this modular concept is that the 
suppliers of HTGR technology would be able to control 
quality standards more easily than would the suppliers of 
LWRs.
Thus, modular HTGRs can, in principle, help remedy 
the current woes of U. S. utilities. The reactors also 
hold considerable promise for use in developing nations, 
which would appreciate their safety and reliability as 
well as their suitability for increasing electrical gene­
ration incrementally to match demand.®
The Candu
The Canadian Candu reactor also has automatic con­
trol devices which relieve the operator of the need to 
make quick decisions under stressful conditions. Adjust­
ments required by transient conditions are made automati­
cally by the regulating system, which can bring the plant 
from shutdown to the demanded power at a safe and con­
trolled rate without intervention by the operator.
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Therefore, the operator is free to make full use of his 
diagnostic abilities. The major endorsement for the Candu 
as an alternative is that the technology is proven.^
Renewables
Promising renewable sources of electricity include 
small-scale hydropower, geothermal energy, biomass energy, 
wind power, and photovoltaic solar energy. In addition, 
cogeneration, the combined production of heat and power, is 
a rapidly growing alternative to central power plants. The 
relative costs of these alternatives compared to nuclear
oand coal power are shown in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1
Projections of Estimated Cost of Electricity for 
1990 (in 1982 dollars)
Energy Source_______________________ Cents per kilowatt-hour
Biomass  7 - 1 0
Coal  8 - 1 0
Cogeneration   4 -  6
Conservation   3 -  5
Nuclear  1 4 - 1 6
PhotoVOItaies   1 0 - 2 0
Small Hydropower .................................. 1 0 - 1 2
Wind Power    6 - 1 0
(9) Source: Flavin, Christopher, (1984), "Reassessing
the Economics of Nuclear Power," World Watch (1984), p. 134
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Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives
The questions of acid rain pollution and carbon 
dioxide pollution of the upper atmosphere have to be com­
pared to the dangers of nuclear pollution. This compari­
son, to be complete is outside the scope of this paper.
The effects of the fossil fired pollution in the upper at­
mosphere is unknown but is postulated to be either of two, 
the "greenhouse effect" or "perpetual winter." The green­
house effect is that a layer of carbon dioxide would 
seal in the heat from the sun and cause a gradual rising 
of the earth's atmospheric temperatures to the point 
wherein the ice caps would begin to melt. This would 
cause widespread flooding and the loss of much of our land 
mass. The perpetual winter effect is that the haze from 
burning the fossil fuels would block the sun's rays and 
cause a gradual but devastating decrease in the world's 
temperatures. These two possibilities are dichotomous 
and no one knows which might be the result of massive use 
of fossil fuel burning. The one thing that does seem cer­
tain is that something will happen, the effects of which 
will be far reaching and irreversible. Thus, we have a 
situation where many of the alternatives (particularly
coal power) seem as bad, or worse, than the nuclear con-
*  • *  - 10 tamination.
Federal Environmental officials have decided to
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force the utilities to comply with a 1983 federal federal 
court ruling that would reduce sulfur dioxide pollution 
by about 10 percent. The pollution control devices would 
cost the utilities over $4 billion by the early 1990s.
The impact of this effort would be to reduce sulfur 
dioxide emissions that we pump into the air by approxi­
mately three million tons of the twenty-four million tons 
of pollutant emitted each year. Acid rain would thus be 
reduced but not eliminated. The action was forced by the 
Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council when 
they successfully challenged the Reagan Administration’s 
rules in court, arguing that they didn't sufficiently pro­
tect the environment.^^
Anti-Alternatives
As far as energy is concerned, we're not going to 
end up with what we choose to have or even what we want 
to have. When it comes to energy, we are going to be 
left with what is possible. In other words, we don't have 
much of a choice.
Oil has become too valuable to use for electrical 
generation. Coal has its problems, too; acid rain, sul­
fates, and all the rest. There are all kinds of figures 
for the number of deaths every year that are a result of 
mining and burning coal. It is in the tens of thousands if 
you include both deaths from respiratory ailments caused by
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coal (including black lung disease) and from mine accidents
One thing is certain: burning coal is not safe or clean.
Even if you burned it as cleanly as possible, eliminating
all the sulfates by using stack scrubbers, you would still
have the problems of the ash that contains toxic elements
1 2and the COg that is being put into the atmosphere.
Hydroelectric power is the most efficient and least
polluting, but there are limits to how much hydro we can
count on. In some parts of the country, virtually all of
the hydro available has been tapped. It floods valuable
farm land. Also, many environmentalists are less happy
with a dam than with a nuclear power plant, especially
dams that block big, wild rivers —  the dams that make
13the most power.
That leaves the "soft energies" —  solar, geother­
mal, wind and biomass— all of those technologies that 
looked so promising and have delivered so little. Most 
of them will never be large-scale producers of power be­
cause the gathering and conversion process is inefficient 
and requires too much large-scale energy intensive tech­
nology. Solar, for instance, requires large amounts of 
high-purity silicon, which is expensive and requires a lot 
of energy to make it commercially available. That is one 
reason we haven't seen the kind of boom in the solar­
generated production of electricity that was predicted ten 
years ago. Solar advocates, likewise, never mentioned
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how expensive the requisite materials would be or how much 
space the reflectors would take up —  thirteen square miles 
of land to produce the same amount of power that comes from 
an atomic plant the size of a city block.
Every technology has environmental drawbacks. Wind 
power, for instance, requires windmill farms on the tops of 
mountains. Roads must be built to service them, and trans­
mission lines are needed to get the power from the generat­
ing site to where it will be used. Additionally, wind
15power, so far, has not proved very efficient.
The biggest change in the utility industry in recent 
years has been the new role of "end use" energy efficiency 
as an alternative to new power plants of any kind. By 
increasing the amount of light delivered by a light bulb or 
the work performed by an industrial motor for every 
killowatt-hour of electricity used, the same energy ser­
vices are gained at less than it would cost for new gener­
ating facilities.
Thoughts on Nuclear Power
U. S. industry and government studies have been 
slow to recognize the declining economic competitiveness of 
nuclear power. Careful analysis of the utilities own data 
for the 30 odd U.S. plants scheduled for completion in the 
mid-eighties shows that the electricity they produce will 
cost on average 65 percent more than coal fired power and
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25 percent more than oil fired energy (the high cost of
which has often been cited as a major reason for building
17nuclear plants).
Outside the United States, the picture is somewhat 
murky but appears to show high and growing costs for 
nuclear power, worldwide. J. W. Jeffrey, a retired 
University of London professor, conducted a thorough eco­
nomic assessment of British nuclear plants and concluded 
that nuclear power is considerably more expensive than 
coal-fired power. Said Professor Jeffrey, "Nuclear power
has not been economic, is not economic and is likely to
18get more uneconomic in the future."
In Germany, nuclear electricity costs at least 60 
percent more than coal-fired electricity. Even in France, 
nuclear power does not seem to be cheaper than coal-fired 
power. The Soviet Union released figures in the latest 
Five-Year-Plan that nuclear power plants are 80-100 per­
cent more expensive to build than coal plants. Data re­
leased on Canada's CANDU nuclear power plants show that 
construction costs went from $400 per kilowatt of capacity 
in 1972 to $1,700 in the early eighties, a real rate of 
increase of 6 percent after accounting for inflation. In
India, the government now admits that nuclear power is more
19expensive than coal-fired electricity.
Comparisons of nuclear economics in strictly 
quantitative terms seems hopeless considering the lack of
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comprehensive and reliable data. However, substantial 
cost increases appear to have been near universal. Most 
disturbing is that the situation seems to worsen with time. 
Many countries appear poised to repeat the disappointing 
economic experience of nuclear power in the United States.
Conclusions to be drawn from this chapter;
1) The relative cost of nuclear power is rising due to 
delays in construction time, the fact that the plants often 
are not as dependable as they have been portrayed to be, 
high interest rates, the decrease in growth of demand for 
electricity and the fact that alternative sources of energy 
are not increasing in cost as anticipated.
2) Many of the alternatives for nuclear energy have 
frightening environmental side effects. These must be con­
sidered when we are establishing the proper mix of energy 
sources.
3) Conservâtionism does not seem to be an option for the 
developing countries since their energy consumption is 
based on real need and has little in the way of frills that 
may be reduced.
4) The spatial relationship of coal to many of the con­
sumers of energy will one day cause increases in price for 
that commodity that may make the nuclear alternative more 
appealing. In many countries, the high cost of nuclear
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power is justified by the fact that they are not hostage to 
the oil cartel and would have supplies of energy even if 
there were major political upheaval in the Middle East.
5) It is not clear whether many of the nuclear alterna­
tives will ever become commercially feasible. At this 
time, there is insufficient emphasis being placed on their 
development for them to be considered a threat to the 
long-term viability of the nuclear industry. However, 
technological breakthroughs for many of these alternatives 
may be expected over the extended period of time involved 
in the nuclear predicament.
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CHAPTER SIX
Conclusions and Recommendations on 
Exporting Nuclear Power
Discussion
The central issues of this chapter:
1) A brief recapitulation of salient points from previous 
chapters.
2) Conclusions reached by the author as to nuclear energy.
3) Recommendations by the author for the nuclear industry.
The kind of fundamental changes that are neces­
sary for nuclear power to continue as an alternative in the 
world's industrialized nations do not seem to be in the 
offing. Those would be: a guaranteed reduction in nuclear
construction costs and a major surge in electricity growth. 
Both are far from likely. The continued financial crisis 
caused by the remaining nuclear projects hardly creates 
a climate conducive to major new investment programs.^
The ability of U. S. suppliers to survive a long 
drought, in the sense of retaining the skilled manpower to 
allow market re-entry when demand returns, if it does, 
should not be underestimated. Servicing and fueling the 
stock of operating reactors has become a substantial and
114
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
lucrative business, and the upgrading of existing nuclear 
plants will keep the technology moving to some degree.
More significant still in terms of international viability, 
Westinghouse and General Electric can exploit their ties 
with licensees in Spain, Italy and particularly Japan to 
keep abreast of technical development, compete in joint
2ventures and extract a rent from licensees' home markets.
Projected Growth of Demand
A world of eight billion people is almost surely 
going to demand more energy than we use today, assuming 
the energy can be found. The most recent projections by 
the U. S. government and the electric-power industry sug­
gest that demand will grow by between 2.5 and 3.2 percent 
per year from now to the end of the century. In the recent 
past, official forecasts almost invariably overestimated 
growth in demand. But, even if the growth rate turns out 
to be significantly lower than this -- under 2 percent —  
the world will still require new plants, with a combined 
capacity of several thousand megawatts per year, to come
3on line starting in the late 1990s.
The above projection compares favorably with the 
one by Ralph M. Rotty of the Institute for Energy Analysis 
and Wolf Haefele of the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis. They visualize a world that uses three 
to four times as much energy in 2030 as we use today. Were
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most of this to come from coal, the world would have to 
mine 25 billion tons of coal each year. We have discussed 
some of the problems with coal-fired energy in previous 
chapters, and I would imagine that, given the volume of 25 
billion tons per year, the dangers of nuclear energy would 
pale by comparison.
Even if only one-half of this proposed energy 
were produced by nuclear reactors, we would be speaking of 
a world of 7,500 reactors. Is this credible?
The demand for utility central station electricity 
is projected to continue to grow after 2000, but at lower 
rates than that projected through the mid-term. Average 
annual growth in electricity demand is projected to be 2.6 
percent from 1980 through 2000. This compares with an 
average 2.9 percent annual growth from 1973 to 1980. In 
addition, both coal and nuclear generating stations are 
projected to generate larger shares of total electricity in
4the year 2000 and thereafter through 2020.
These two independent estimates of future growth 
of demand for electricity are both similar, and it does 
seem reasonable to assume that there will be some growth.
The real question is, "What role will nuclear power play 
in that growth?” The technology of nuclear power must 
change and, also, the economics for it to become an accept^ 
able part of the long term energy mix. On the good side, 
if demand for nuclear energy does return in the late 1990s
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as some have projected, there should be an available 
nuclear waste repository to meet the challenge of further 
nuclear energy production.
Worldwide, the nuclear alternative will survive 
only if it has an advantage over other forms of energy.
That advantage may be as simple as the fact that, for 
some, nuclear power is the only form of energy they can 
turn to if they intend to emerge from their primitive life 
styles. For most, the question will hinge on the economics 
of the nuclear option. In the last five years, there has 
been a dramatic change in world demand for nuclear energy.
As the factors that caused that change themselves change, we 
could see a reversal in the downward spiral of nuclear 
power. We must not lose sight of the fact that there is 
some risk that the nuclear power industry will not remain 
commercially viable in a climate of uncertain and variable 
markets. The fact is that markets of any kind are becom-
5ing increasingly rare for the nuclear industry.
The risks of a descent into nuclear anarchy, akin 
to that prevailing in the conventional arms trade, should 
not be exaggerated. There is a general awareness of the 
dangers to political and economic relations that would re­
sult from reckless nuclear trading. China's recent sale of 
unsafeguarded materials to Argentina notwithstanding, sup­
pliers around the world may have stumbled on a de facto 
agreement; namely, that all new sales to non-nuclear weapon
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States be safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, even if those safeguards do not amount to the 
full-scope safeguards of the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty. Membership in the Agency is not compatible with 
any other conduct. There also appears to be a general 
climate of restraint over the transfer of sensitive tech­
nologies and materials. India and Pakistan, for instance, 
have given no grounds for believing that they will behave 
uncautiously in the international market.®
Conclusions
Economics
In the short term, the nuclear industry worldwide 
is going to have to accept severe contraction of its opera­
tions. This is due primarily to economics surrounding the 
technology, not the technology itself. There is room for 
improvement in the technology but little hope that the sup­
pliers of nuclear reactors will be willing to spend more 
than they have to improve something that is not selling 
well to begin with. Investors in the United States will not 
soon allow themselves to get burned again, so in this coun­
try, the nuclear option is essentially dead for the fore­
seeable future. Conservâtionism has surfaced as the domi­
nant force in world energy, and many feel that the extent 
to which energy can be conserved has not really been 
explored yet. However, conservation in Third World
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countries amounts to not being able to move into the 
twentieth century (soon to be the twenty-first century) 
and, as expectations rise, that option will not be very 
tasteful.
Ethics
My research has not brought out any earth shaking 
ethical dilemma regarding the exporting of nuclear tech­
nology to the Third World countries, other than prolifer­
ation and the fact that they, too, have suffered from 
uneconomical nuclear power. These countries have not paid 
for their capability to generate nuclear power. For the 
most part, it has been financed by suppliers and the govern­
ments of various industrialized countries, subsidizing their 
country's nuclear industry. It has been claimed that 
nuclear power does little to provide jobs for the citizens 
of these developing countries and certainly there are ethi­
cal overtones to that claim. The fact is that, when a 
country has power, it has the ability to create industries 
(other than nuclear) that could and would employ the citi­
zens.
The question of weapons proliferaton has been 
addressed at length and makes anyone nervous. The entire 
world community must become concerned and cooperate to 
prevent countries such as Pakistan from attaining a weapons 
capability. This is due to the obvious fact that
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often these smaller countries are threatened by their 
neighbors in wars that we look upon as small, but which 
to the contestants are life and death matters. When a 
country is about to lose and the present government is 
about to be put on trial, can we doubt for a minute that 
they would use any weapon at hand to survive. Of course, 
as we saw, there is an element of deterrence in the possi­
bility of a country having nuclear weapons, but can we rely 
on that deterrence in countries where there are far fewer 
cross checks and balances of power than in the major coun­
tries? It is well and good to talk about the fact that the 
countries suspected of having a weapons capability are pre­
sently acting responsibly —  but for how long? Ironically, 
there does not have to be a proliferation of weapons capa­
bility for countries to enjoy the fruits of nuclear power. 
All that is necessary is to withhold the fuel reprocessing 
or enrichment technology. Can this be done? I doubt it. 
Can we go back from where we are? I doubt it. My personal 
answer is —  I worry a lot.
There is no turning back. The United States 
started the whole thing by exporting its nuclear technology 
to the industrialized countries. However, if we had not, 
someone else would have. Nuclear power was a thing whose 
time had come. For the time being, it appears that its 
time has gone. The United States and the other industrial­
ized countries that have nuclear power are all trying to
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export it to the Third World countries. This is in order 
to keep their nuclear industries flourishing and techni­
cians at the cutting edge of technology.
In the long run, I feel that new technology will 
emerge that is both safe and economically sound. This will 
not happen any time soon, but eventually, population, pol­
lution, and rising expectations will overcome the malaise 
of the nuclear industry, and it will re-emerge as an im­
portant part of the energy mix.
Another factor to be considered is the spatial 
relationship of coal to the consumers. The major free world 
deposits are located in America and Australia. How long 
will these countries supply this resource at a bargain price 
that allows economical use even considering extensive ship­
ping costs. Oil is obviously too expensive to be used for 
anything except transportation, so it seems that nuclear 
energy will have to come into its own once again. There 
is a possibility that another form of technology will 
emerge. However, the present alternatives do not have the 
broad application for central station utility power that 
nuclear power has.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Recommendations
1) BUILD ON THE TECHNOLOGY. The nuclear industry 
is holding out as best it can. Conservation will likely 
reduce demand for new nuclear facilities for at least the 
next decade. Emerging nations are presently in serious 
financial difficulties, and that will not be resolved in 
the near future. In this environment, the sunk costs of 
various suppliers, utilities, investors and governments 
are the focus of attention. This should not be the case. 
When there are other opportunities that may be more advan­
tageous, the sunk costs of previous projects should not be 
considered. I do agree that these costs should in this 
case, encourage building on a technology that has obvious 
long term applicability. Mr. Bray, of General Electric, 
is probably right in his statement that the present light 
water technology is sound —  the problem is, it doesn't 
seem to be economical. Many things have changed since the 
LWR technology was developed, and those factors (such as 
the fact that there is now a relative abundance of uranium) 
should be considered in advancing the technology toward 
economic viability. I recommend that the industry hold its 
technical staff together in a research and development 
effort to find a standardized, flexible, cheap, reliable,
122
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available and safe method of generating nuclear electricity. 
This would have to be financed by the nuclear aftermath 
market since few new orders are forthcoming.
2) DEVELOP AFFORDABLE NUCLEAR POWER. I feel 
that the best new market for nuclear power will be in the 
Third World nations. The industrialized nations will re­
quire more nuclear power at some point but have a long way 
to go in their ability to conserve. Additionally, they are 
generally in a position to provide that power themselves.
For the Third World market to become a reality, the sup­
pliers must refine their ability to deliver tailor-made 
power units that will fit the financial and power needs of 
each country. There must be no more cost overruns. That 
is easy to say, yet, somehow it must be accomplished. If 
we can develop technology as intricate as nuclear power, 
we should be able to find a way to build it so that it 
is affordable. Perhaps modular units will allow the con­
trol and standardization necessary. Construction cost over­
runs have been the chief reasons for curtailment of nuclear 
projects, along with the Third World countries* inability to 
service their debts. The fear of the unknown has caused 
cancellations of many nuclear projects. To make the nuclear 
option appealing, the suppliers must guarantee construction 
costs. There can be no surprises. Five to six hundred 
percent overruns make potential customers nervous. If 
these countries are to prosper and pay off their debt.
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they must have power. What we are obviously talking about 
is International Monetary Fund help in restructuring their 
debts in such a way that financing of needed nuclear power 
is still possible.
3) ELIMINATE DELAYS AND INCREASE RELIABILITY.
The problems of delays in delivery combined with unreliable 
reactors, causing costly down time, must be resolved for 
nuclear energy to become or remain competitive with present 
forms of electricity. Whatever resources are necessary to 
meet schedules must be expended by the industry. The finan­
cial implications of this are obvious. Only the top engi­
neers can be assigned to construction projects, and quality 
control must be very tight in order to assure reliable and 
safe reactors. Sloppy workmanship and inferior materials 
must never again be associated with nuclear power. In the 
Third World, the environmentalists are not really a factor. 
These emerging people are quite pragmatic about their needs, 
and nuclear power could fulfill many of those needs if it 
was affordable and reliable. The environment must be con­
sidered in every case, and to do so, will not only make 
nuclear power more attractive to the Third World, but it 
will enhance the image of the industry worldwide.
4) BE SERIOUS ABOUT STOPPING PROLIFERATION. The 
United States and the Soviet Union should take advantage 
of the recent warming of relations and push forward on a 
broad front to stop the spread of weapons technology. This
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has been pretended to in the past, but it was obvious to 
the world that the major players did not take it seriously. 
There must not be any more looking the other way.
5) MULTILATERAL EFFORT REQUIRED. Nuclear power 
is certainly not a panacea, as has been shown by the reduc­
tion in demand for new facilities worldwide. However, 
there is no doubt in my mind that it must remain an impor­
tant and growing part of the energy mix in the long term. 
Every effort should be made to hold the technology together 
for the long haul.
In order for the nuclear industry to survive in the 
United States, the market in the United States must survive. 
Otherwise, the industry will migrate to other countries 
where the climate is more favorable. It is not a question 
of whether nuclear energy will survive, the question is, 
"Where?" Survival in the United States does not seem to be 
possible under the present circumstances. Changes must be 
made. This may mean further government involvement in cen­
tralizing management of the utility operations, standardized 
reactor plans, reducing unfounded litigation (such as is 
now done in Canada) and, in extreme cases, subsidizing of 
the industry might be justified. The utilities must develop 
the technical expertise to recognize their needs and be able 
to articulate them to the suppliers. This ability has 
always existed insofar as other forms of energy were con­
cerned but has been noticeably lacking in the nuclear area.
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The nuclear industry in this country must realize that it 
too will have to progress if it is to remain competitive 
with emerging nuclear technologies being pursued by other 
countries. This is not the time for the industry to sit 
back and rest on its laurels. Few countries would buy 
a LWR when an operational PIUS or HTGR could be purchased.
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APPENDIX "A"
A History of Nuclear Power in the United States
In 1939, two Austrian physicists, Otto Hahn and 
Fritz Strassman, split the uranium atom's nucleus for the 
first time. This produced the release of tremendous power, 
and the military significance was immediately recognized. 
Germany was hard at work to develop an atomic weapon, and 
the allied powers knew it. Einstein persuaded President 
Roosevelt to embark on a massive project to develop an 
atomic bomb, and thus was born the Manhattan Project.
Teams of the free world's top scientists came to partici­
pate in this project by the hundreds of thousands. The 
first nuclear reactor was developed, built and tested only 
three years after the discovery of the fission process and 
only three years after that an atomic bomb was successfully 
detonated in the New Mexico desert. Then followed, of 
course, the demonstrated devastation at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki which effectively brought Japan to her knees.
After World War Two, the expected diversion of
effort from the "war atom" to the "peace atom" did not
materialize. In 1946, Congress passed the Atomic Energy
Act which established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).
From the beginning, the AEC gave priority to military
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applications and, in the minds of many, the difference be­
tween war atoms and peace atoms remained small.
In 1953, the Eisenhower administration announced 
the Atoms for Peace Program. This allowed for the sharing 
of technological and scientific expertise with other coun­
tries. Domestically, however, several major obstacles 
hindered the transfer of the peaceful atom to the private 
sector. First, much of the nuclear technology remained 
highly classified, and companies not involved directly in 
military research had restricted access to important infor­
mation. Second, vast engineering problems had not yet been 
solved; it was extremely difficult to create an entirely 
new technology of steel and rare metals which could with­
stand the blistering conditions of intense radiation, tem­
peratures and pressures found in reactors. Third, the 
utilities were not convinced that reactors could generate 
electricity competitively with proven technologies like 
coal and oil. For the utilities, one crucial question 
remained: "Could the atom generate profits?
In 1954, Congress revised the Atomic Energy Act 
to allow for private ownership of nuclear facilities under 
AEC license and, in 1957, passed the Price Anderson Act 
that protected utility companies from full financial liabil­
ity for a serious nuclear accident.
Admiral Rickover was instrumental in the success­
ful launch of the first atomic submarine and the first
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atomic aircraft carrier; this technology (light water 
reactors) resulted in the first full scale nuclear generat­
ing plant in 1957 in Shippingport, Pennsylvania. This was 
a 60 megawatt demonstration reactor and was a scaled-up 
version of the small submarine reactor. When the power of 
this reactor came on line, commercial nuclear power appeared 
to many to be a reasonable alternative to coal or oil 
powered plants.^
During the 1960s, the gold rush to produce nuclear 
power began. General Electric lead the way, followed by the 
other three reactor manufacturers (Babcock and Wilcox, 
Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering) in offering the 
utilities reactors at a fixed cost that would only escalate 
in response to inflation during the period of construction. 
This, plus the low costs of operation, caused many utili­
ties to go nuclear. From the beginning, it was obvious 
that G.E. and Westinghouse were the dominant firms in the 
industry (Indeed, Babcock and Wilcox and Combustion 
Engineering had entered the field only to protect their
3market share as boilermakers.)
G.E. and Westinghouse had what might be termed a 
corporate nuclear war at this time. Westinghouse emerged 
as the front runner by offering uranium to the utilities 
at a guaranteed rate of $10 per pound. This proved to be 
disastrous for Westinghouse as the increased demand for the 
fuel and the limited supplies drove the price of uranium
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to $26 per pound. Westinghouse was faced with potential 
losses of $2 billion which would be unthinkable for the 
company. Ordered to find a way out of the quagmire, com­
pany lawyers discovered an arcane doctrine of "commercial 
impracticality,” a legal device that excuses companies 
from financial liability for circumstances beyond their con­
trol. This left a very embarrassed Westinghouse and furious 
utility companies. An outside consultant blasted the 
shamed company stating, "This was the most stupid per-
4formance in the history of American commercial life."
The problem of limited supplies of nuclear fuel 
(uranium) was supposedly solved by Milton Shaw, a director 
of the AEC in 1964, who had the "foresight" to see that the 
breeder reactor could stretch fuel supplies indefinitely.
He then focused the energies of the AEC on the development 
of this type of reactor and neglected the light water tech­
nology totally; this at a time when the light water reactors 
were being scaled up by factors of ten and twenty times.
When the first breeder reactor came on line in October,
1966, it suffered a small melting incident in its uranium 
core. Although this was not close to a meltdown, it was in 
excess of the industry’s postulated "worst-case accident." 
Four years later, the power plant was about to go into 
operation again, and it had an explosion in a reactor pipe. 
The AEC lifted the license of the operator, and to this day 
there are no breeder reactors operating in the United
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States.^
To get back to the light water reactors that had 
been scaled up during this period in response to the demand 
for nuclear power ; there had not been attendant safety 
studies made to assure that the level of scale up was truly 
safe. Such studies as the Atomic Energy Commission did do 
were done by computer models, but not by running a reactor 
to destruction to see what really would happen. This type 
of testing would be extremely expensive but would remove 
doubt as to what the worst-case consequences of a nuclear 
accident would be.®
In destructive, full-scale testing to investigate 
the explosion and radioactivity release potentials of the 
worst possible accidents (WPA), the reactor vessel is 
likely to be destroyed, which would drive up the cost of 
each test from, say, $20 million per test (core costs) to, 
say, $300 million to replace the reactor system and for 
radioactivity cleanup, if cleaning is feasible. This, plus 
the fact that there are many substantially different WPAs 
requiring tests, makes any meaningful experimental program 
economically impossible. Note that this was taken from a 
1976 text.^
The 1970s saw continued expansion of the rapidly 
developing technology amid rising doubts as to its safety. 
Powerful economic forces began to affect the nuclear indus­
try in the late 1970s as declining usage of electricity.
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runaway inflation and sharply rising interest rates began 
to erode the glamour of nuclear power. (A reactor came to 
cost over $1 billion.) Then, too, changing safety stan­
dards and court interventions caused lengthy delays in 
construction time (that already exceeded ten years) with 
corresponding cost overruns.
By this time, it was becoming obvious that the 
problem of waste disposal had not been given the attention 
that it deserved. Waste has been accumulating at nuclear 
plant sites since there is no federal repository for high 
level waste.
In 1975, the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, 
near Decatur, Alabama, suffered a fire caused by a careless 
technician that crippled the emergency core cooling sys­
tems; a last minute jury rigged pump prevented a meltdown 
of the core. Four years later, on March 28, 1979, a $0.15 
part malfunctioned and triggered the most severe accident 
in the history of commercial nuclear power. The Three Mile 
Island reactor began to heat up and steam pressure in the 
pipes began to rise. The pressure valve, as it was sup­
posed to do, blew open, but as it was not supposed to do, 
it failed to close. This resulted in several hundred 
thousand gallons of cooling water leaking out and left the 
core exposed for more than an hour. The resultant heat 
caused uranium gasses to be vented into the surrounding 
atmosphere. The control room operators were inexperienced
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and did not know how to cope with an accident of this type 
Since then, better emergency planning, fire safety codes 
and more rigorous inspection procedures reduce the chances 
for another such accident. (Three Mile Island has still 
not reopened.)
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